



THE ROLE OF ANTITRUST IN PREVENTING  
PATENT HOLDUP 
CARL SHAPIRO† AND MARK A. LEMLEY†† 
Patent holdup has proven one of the most controversial topics in innovation policy, 
in part because companies with a vested interest in denying its existence have spent 
tens of millions of dollars trying to debunk it. Notwithstanding a barrage of political 
and academic attacks, both the general theory of holdup and its practical application 
in patent law remain valid and pose significant concerns for patent policy. Patent and 
antitrust law have made significant strides in the past fifteen years in limiting the 
problem of patent holdup. But those advances are currently under threat from the 
Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, which has reversed prior policies and 
broken with the Federal Trade Commission to downplay the significance of patent 
holdup while undermining private efforts to prevent it. Ironically, the effect of the 
Antitrust Division’s actions is to create a greater role for antitrust law in stopping 
patent holdup. We offer some suggestions for moving in the right direction. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Patent holdup occurs when a patent holder is able to obtain unreasonably 
high royalties by asserting its patent against another company’s products 
because that company’s most efficient way to develop, make, and sell those 
target products involves investments that cannot easily be redeployed to non-
infringing products.1 The owner of a valid patent that is essential to making 
devices that comply with a popular telecommunications standard would wield 
enormous monopoly power if it could block device manufacturers from 
 
1 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE 
AND REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 191 (2011), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ 
reports/evolving-ip-marketplace-aligning-patent-notice-and-remedies-competition-report-federal-
trade/110307patentreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/EG7V-NNAL] (“The ability of patentees to demand and 
obtain royalty payments based on the switching costs faced by accused infringers, rather than the ex ante 
value of the patented technology compared to alternatives, is commonly called ‘hold-up.’”). In the context 
of standard-setting, the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission have defined holdup as 
“the ability of an intellectual property holder to extract more favorable licensing terms after a standard is 
set.” U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND COMPETITION 5 (2007), 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2007/07/11/222655.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y97Y-KNM5]. 
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selling products that comply with that standard. The elevated royalty rates 
that would result from such unconstrained monopoly power would be passed 
through to device prices, causing substantial consumer harm. These problems 
would be magnified because there are thousands of Standard-Essential 
Patents (“SEPs”) reading on modern telecommunications standards, and each 
SEP owner could demand a monopoly price to permit use of the standard. 
We address the proper role of antitrust in this setting. While many holdup 
problems can be solved without antitrust law, antitrust has a role to play in 
policing holdup, particularly in cases where the patent owner avoids its 
contractual commitments or uses a SEP to restrict competition in adjacent 
markets. The very forces in the federal government that currently oppose 
antitrust intervention also oppose using patent or contract law to enforce 
commitments to license patents on Fair Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory 
(“FRAND”) terms. They have done so in part by denying the very existence 
of the problem. Ironically, their efforts may make antitrust intervention more, 
not less, important. 
The problem of patent holdup is a special instance of the general problem 
of holdup that has been studied extensively in the literature on transaction 
cost economics.2 Opportunism by firms generally discourages investments 
that are subject to holdup. As a special case of that general principle, patent 
holdup retards innovation. With more than 300,000 utility patents issued 
each year by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”),3 preventing 
patent holdup is critical to promoting economic growth, especially in 
industries experiencing rapid technological progress, where patent holdup 
can act as a headwind slowing down innovation. 
Considerable progress to address the problem of patent holdup was made 
from 2006 to 2016: 
• The Supreme Court’s 2006 eBay decision greatly reduced the threat 
of patent holdup by limiting the availability of injunctions to patent 
holders, particularly those patent holders whose only legitimate 
interest was in collecting a reasonable licensing fee.4 
• The Federal Circuit cracked down on junk science in patent damages 
in a series of decisions. These decisions rejected the “25 percent rule 
 
2 “This type of hold up is a variant of the classical ‘hold-up problem.’” Id. at 35 n.11. See infra 
Section I for further discussion. 
3 U.S. Patent Activity Calendar Years 1790 to the Present, USPTO, 
https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/h_counts.htm [https://perma.cc/MA3K-FV92] 
(last visited Apr. 10, 2020).  
4 See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 392-93 (2006) (rejecting the rule that 
injunctions are automatic on a finding of infringement); id. at 396-97 (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(“[L]egal damages may well be sufficient to compensate for the infringement [of patents used 
primarily for obtaining licensing fees] and an injunction may not serve the public interest.”). 
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of thumb.”5 They require courts in complex product cases to 
apportion damages, awarding the patentee damages only for the 
value their invention contributed and preventing them from using 
an inflated claim over the entire product to hold up the 
manufacturer.6 They also empower district courts to vet and reject 
untested economic theories before trial in a Daubert proceeding.7 
• The Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit made it easier for 
defendants to recover their attorneys’ fees in frivolous cases,8 
significantly reducing the profitability of “bottom-feeder” patent 
trolls that relied on the cost of litigation as the basis of holdup.9 
• The United States Trade Representative in 2013 vetoed an exclusion 
order awarded by the International Trade Commission (ITC) related 
to a Samsung SEP infringed by certain Apple smartphones and 
tablets, explicitly expressing concerns about patent hold-up.10 
• The Federal Circuit’s 2014 decision in Ericsson v. D-Link Systems, Inc. 
established, in the context of SEPs where a patent owner has 
promised to license on FRAND terms, that “reasonable royalties” 
should reflect the incremental value of the patented invention prior 
to its inclusion in an industry standard and not the value associated 
with standardization.11 
• The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in 2015 
substantially clarified and strengthened the FRAND commitments 
it requires of participants, limiting the circumstances under which 
SEP holders could seek injunctions and clarifying the meaning of 
 
5 See Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (holding that 
“the 25 percent rule of thumb is . . . fundamentally flawed”). 
6 See Finjan, Inc. v Blue Coat Sys., Inc., 879 F.3d 1299, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“When the 
accused technology does not make up the whole of the accused product, apportionment is 
required.”); Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1226 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“[T]he ultimate 
reasonable royalty award must be based on the incremental value that the patented invention adds 
to the end product.”); Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, 580 F.3d 1301, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (rejecting 
a damages calculation that used an inflated royalty rate). 
7 See Uniloc, 632 F.3d at 1306 (“Under Daubert, the District Court must exercise its ‘gatekeeper’ 
function in ensuring that scientific testimony is relevant and reliable.”). 
8 See Octane Fitness, LLC v. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc., 572 U.S. 545, 557 (2014) (rejecting the 
“Federal Circuit’s requirement that patent litigants establish their entitlement to fees under § 285 by 
‘clear and convincing evidence’”); Adjustacam, LLC v. Newegg, Inc., 861 F.3d 1353, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 
2017) (awarding attorney’s fees to the defendant under § 285 as a result of “dubious behavior” by the 
plaintiff). As a disclosure, one of us (Lemley) represented defendant Newegg in that case. 
9 For a discussion of this problem, see Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the 
Forest for the Trolls, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2126, 2167 (2013). 
10 See Letter from Michael B. G. Froman, Ambassador, to Irving A. Williamson, Chairman, 
Int’l Trade Comm’n 2 (Aug. 3, 2013), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/08032013%20Letter_1.PDF 
[https://perma.cc/AD57-DKFC] (citing patent holdup as one of the bases for his veto). 
11 Ericsson, Inc., 773 F.3d at 1226, 1232. 
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“reasonable rates,”12 with support from the Department of Justice in 
the form of a favorable business review letter.13 
• The Federal Trade Commission and its European and Asian 
counterparts took several actions to prevent owners of SEPs from 
behaving opportunistically by seeking injunctions on FRAND-
encumbered patents.14 
Further progress to limit patent holdup can be made in three areas. 
• Private Contracts: industry participants can do more to prevent patent 
holdup. Notably, more Standards Setting Organizations (“SSOs”) 
can follow the lead of the IEEE by clarifying and strengthening their 
FRAND policies and creating mechanisms to enforce those policies. 
• Patent Law: the courts can continue to build the case law establishing 
that patent damages should be based on the value of the patented 
invention to the infringing party prior to that party making 
investments specific to that technology, and simplifying patent 
damages to insure that reasonable royalties do not exceed that 
incremental value. 
• Antitrust Enforcement: as a backstop, competition authorities can 
promote innovation and protect consumers by taking appropriate 
enforcement actions against firms that abuse the market power 
associated with SEPs and/or breach their FRAND commitments to 
avoid those patent and contract law limits. 
 
12 See IEEE-SA STANDARDS BOARD BYLAWS §6 at 2, http://standards.ieee.org/develop 
/policies/bylaws/approved-changes.pdf [https://perma.cc/P9P8-4MKA] (last visited May 20, 2020) 
(defining “Reasonable Rates” as “appropriate compensation to the patent holder for the practice of 
an Essential Patent Claim excluding the value, if any, resulting from the inclusion of that Essential 
Patent Claim’s technology in the IEEE Standard” and including a list of considerations for 
determining reasonable rates). 
13 Letter from Renata B. Hesse, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Michael 
A. Lindsay, Esquire, Dorsey & Whitney LLP 6 (Feb. 2, 2015) 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/busreview/311470.pdf [https://perma.cc/258G-5TXF] (noting 
that IEEE’s new RAND commitment “may further help to mitigate hold up”). 
14 The FTC enforcement actions were taken against Bosch and Google. In re Robert Bosch 
GmbH Corp., 155 F.T.C. 713 (2013); Mototola Mobility LLC & Google Inc., 156 F.T.C. 147 (2013). 
In Europe, the Court of Justice of the European Union issued injunctive relief for violating FRAND 
terms. Case C-170/13, Huawei Techs. Co. Ltd v. ZTE Corp., EU:C:2015:477 at 10-11 (July 16, 2015). 
Chinese and Korean courts issued similar injunctive relief against Motorola and Samsung. See 
Esther H. Lim & C. Brandon Rash, China Court Swiftly Enforces U.S. Company’s IP Rights Against 
Chinese Company in Motorola v. Guangzhou Weierwei, FINNEGAN (Mar. 2008) 
https://www.finnegan.com/en/insights/articles/china-court-swiftly-enforces-u-s-company-s-ip-
rights-against.html [https://perma.cc/D8AS-P3SZ] (describing a Chinese court issuing such 
injunctive relief against Motorola); Eric Pfanner, Korean Court Rejects Samsung Lawsuit Against Apple, 
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/13/technology/korean-court-rejects-
samsung-lawsuit-against-apple.html [https://perma.cc/CF5Y-GPPD] (describing a Korean court 
issuing such injunctive relief against Apple). 
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We focus below on the role of antitrust enforcement in limiting patent 
holdup. However, we emphasize that we see private contracts and patent law 
as the primary methods to prevent patent holdup. Antitrust is a complement 
and a backstop to these methods, not a substitute for them.15 If SSOs were to 
adopt and enforce effective FRAND policies and courts were to give them 
effect in both contract and patent law, most of the patent holdup problem 
would go away.16 Even then, however, antitrust would still be necessary in 
some circumstances to prevent companies from undermining or evading their 
FRAND commitments, as was the case in Rambus Inc. v. FTC,17 Broadcom 
Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc.,18 and FTC v. Qualcomm Inc.19 
Unfortunately, antitrust enforcement to prevent patent holdup is in danger 
of becoming less effective due to the policy positions currently being taken by 
the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice. These new policy 
positions appear to be based a specious argument that patent holdup is rare or 
unproven, combined with a fundamental misconception about the proper role 
of patents in a market economy. Ironically, while patent and contract law can 
largely solve the patent holdup problem, and while progress on those fronts 
has been made in the past, the Antitrust Division is undermining those efforts 
in ways that might require stronger antitrust intervention. 
In Part I, we discuss transaction cost economics and the general theory of 
holdup. In Part II, we draw on our prior work to explain how these general 
principles apply to the particular case of patent holdup. Part III addresses 
various ways of limiting patent holdup, focusing on the role of antitrust and 
the recent efforts by some, including the Trump Administration, to undo 
recent progress in this area. 
I. TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS AND THE GENERAL THEORY OF 
HOLDUP 
Transactions cost economics explores how for-profit firms in a market 
economy structure their affairs to promote efficient investment in productive 
 
15 See Mark A. Lemley, Ten Things to Do About Patent Holdup of Standards (and One Not to), 48 
B.C. L. REV. 149, 167 (2007) [hereinafter Lemley, Ten Things] (“[A]ntitrust law serves a valuable 
purpose, but where the holdup problem is concerned, it is a backstop.”). 
16 See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, A Simple Approach to Setting Reasonable Royalties for 
Standard-Essential Patents, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1135, 1166 (2013) [hereinafter Lemley & 
Shapiro, A Simple Approach] (“SSOs can and should adopt best practices that will prevent patentee 
holdup while ensuring that the question of the appropriate royalty is resolved in a fair and 
predictable way.”). 
17 522 F.3d 456, 459 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
18 501 F.3d 297, 304-05 (3d Cir. 2007). 
19 411 F. Supp. 3d 658, 672-74 (N.D. Cal. 2019). Shapiro testified on behalf of the FTC in the 
Qualcomm case. For a further discussion of this case, including a critique of the Ninth Circuit 
decision in August 2020 reversing the District Court, see infra Section III.C. 
2020] The Role of Antitrust in Preventing Patent Holdup 2025 
assets.20 Oliver Williamson in particular stressed the dangers of opportunism 
that can arise in the presence of relationship-specific investments. Williamson 
recently explained: 
TCE [transaction cost economics] gave early prominence to the relatively 
neglected condition of asset specificity, which became a crucial defining 
attribute of transactions. Asset specificity describes the condition where the 
identity of the parties matters for the continuity of a relationship . . . . these 
assets cannot be redeployed to alternative uses or users without loss of 
productive value.21 
Williamson has long emphasized what he calls the fundamental 
transformation that occurs when parties make relationship-specific 
investments: ex ante competition can be replaced by ex post monopoly.22 This 
is the problem of holdup: the owner of a key asset can charge more than the 
asset is worth ex ante if the buyer has made asset-specific investments that 
will be lost unless the parties agree on terms of trade. 
A. The Conditions Under Which the Holdup Problem Is Greatest 
As with all great ideas in microeconomics, the general theory of holdup 
identifies a simple and robust economic concept that is amenable to empirical 
testing and validation. The core idea behind the theory of holdup is that a 
party that makes substantial investments, the value of which relies heavily 
upon the actions of another party, is vulnerable to exploitation by that other 
party and thus may have lessened incentives to invest. This core idea is 
intuitive and very general. 
Naturally, a party making a large relationship-specific investment has a strong 
incentive to protect itself from ex post exploitation. Over the past fifty years, the 
 
20 Oliver Williamson was awarded the 2009 Nobel Prize in Economics “for his analysis of 
economic governance, especially the boundaries of the firm.” Ronald Coase was awarded the 1991 
Nobel Prize in Economics “for his discovery and clarification of the significance of transaction costs 
and property rights for the institutional structure and functioning of the economy.” 
21 Steven Tadelis & Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction Cost Economics, in THE HANDBOOK OF 
ORGANIZATIONAL ECONOMICS 159, § 3.1.1, at 164 (Robert Gibbons & John Roberts eds., 2012) 
(emphasis in original) (citations omitted). Williamson was exploring these ideas over forty years 
ago. See Oliver E. Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies: Some Elementary Considerations, 63 AM. 
ECON. REV. 316, 317-18 (1973) (noting that the cost advantages of firm-specific knowledge lead to 
smaller pools of potential players); Oliver E. Williamson, The Vertical Integration of Production: 
Market Failure Considerations, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 112, 116 (1971) (describing the cost advantage of 
prior players with firm-specific knowledge). 
22 See, e.g., Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual 
Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233, 241 (1979) (“[Initial] large-numbers competition . . . is quickly 
thereafter transformed into one of bilateral monopoly—on account of the transaction-specific 
costs . . . .”) (emphasis in original). 
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field of transaction cost economics has grown rapidly based on its powerful ability 
to use asset specificity to explain fundamental business relationships. Notable 
successes include explaining the presence or absence of vertical integration and 
the design and use of long-term contracts. Both are mechanisms designed to 
guard against holdup. In such settings, the terms that well-informed parties 
would negotiate ex ante provide the competitive benchmark against which 
potential solutions to the problem of holdup can be evaluated.23 
As Williamson has emphasized since the 1970s, the potential for holdup—
which we will refer to as “the holdup problem”—is greatest in situations 
where one party invests heavily in assets that are specific to its relationship 
with another party. Situations where efficiency requires substantial 
investment in relationship-specific assets are very common: the worker 
moving to take a new job and learning skills specific to that job; the tenant 
customizing rental space to suit its preferences and needs; the supplier of 
specialized components investing to serve a large customer; and a firm 
developing and designing a new product that might later be found to infringe 
another party’s patent. Likewise, Klein, Crawford and Alchian, in their 
seminal 1978 paper, emphasized the risk of “post-contractual opportunistic 
behavior” after such investments are made.24 They state: “After a specific 
investment is made and such quasi rents are created, the possibility of 
opportunistic behavior is very real.”25 
Managing the holdup problem is most difficult in dynamic and uncertain 
environments where ex ante contracts are necessarily incomplete in 
significant respects. Much of the theoretical literature has explored the 
optimal design of long-term contracts, while the empirical literature has 
identified contracting imperfections and obstacles in a variety of different 
settings.26 
 
23 This competitive benchmark is both sensible and practical: sensible because it rewards a 
supplier based on its superiority over its competitors, and practical because it does not require 
invoking any pre-specified notion of competition, much less perfect competition (which would make 
no sense when we get to patent holdup). 
24 Benjamin Klein, Robert G. Crawford & Armen A. Alchian, Vertical Integration, Appropriable 
Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, J.L. & ECON. 297, 297 (1978). 
25 Id. at 298; see also Tadelis & Williamson, supra note 21, § 3.1.1, at 164 (“[T]hese [transaction-
specific] assets cannot be redeployed to alternative uses or users without loss of productive value.”); 
Oliver Williamson, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 64 (1985) (“[S]ome 
individuals are opportunistic some of the time and that differential trustworthiness is rarely 
transparent ex ante.”). 
26 See generally Tadelis & Williamson, supra note 21; Timothy Bresnahan & Jonathan Levin, 
Vertical Integration and Market Structure, in THE HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATIONAL ECONOMICS 
853 (Robert Gibbons & John Roberts eds., 2012). 
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B. The Social Costs of Holdup 
Holdup causes several types of social costs. First, there are costs 
associated with whatever arrangements are used to control and limit holdup. 
Second, to the extent that those arrangements are imperfect, parties making 
specific investments will not be fully protected from holdup, so their 
incentives to invest and innovate will be undermined, creating deadweight 
loss and inefficiency. Third, actual holdups can create ex post inefficiencies 
and deadweight losses of the sort normally associated with monopoly power. 
Fourth, the prospect of engaging in hold-up can lead to inefficient rent-
seeking behavior by parties trying to place themselves in a position to behave 
opportunistically. This welfare analysis is very similar to the analysis of the 
social costs associated with the problem of theft, which include analogous 
categories: (1) the costs incurred to prevent or mitigate actual thefts; (2) the 
deadweight loss associated with activities deterred due to the fear of theft; 
(3) the costs caused by actual thefts that nonetheless occur; and (4) the cost 
of activities undertaken by would-be thieves to engage in theft.27 
While it is difficult to measure the social costs caused by the holdup 
problem, we can be confident that these costs are elevated by legal rules or 
other public policies that make it more difficult for market participants to 
structure their relationships to manage holdup efficiently. This will be 
important below when we discuss SSO rules to control SEP holdup. 
C. Market Responses to Holdup 
Market participants will structure their relationships as best they can to 
avoid or minimize the inefficiencies associated with opportunism. Three 
mechanisms stand out as common responses to the problem of holdup: (1) 
vertical integration, which aligns interests by placing both parties to the 
relationship inside a single firm; (2) long-term contracts, which ideally can be 
designed to protect the party making the specific investments while 
rewarding the other party based on its ex ante superiority over alternatives; 
and (3) flexibility, whereby the party making the investments shifts from 
specific investments toward more general investments in order to reduce its 
reliance on the other party. Classic examples in the empirical literature 
include vertical integration in the automobile and aerospace industries, the 
 
27 For seminal work on this topic, see Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, 
and Theft, 5 W. ECON. J. 224 (1967). Similarly, Gibbons describes the three sources of “transactional 
failures” that arise in “[d]ifficult [t]ransactions,” namely: “(a) unprogrammed adaption because ex 
ante contracts are incomplete, (b) lock-in arising from the ‘fundamental transformation’ and (c) 
haggling (i.e. inefficient bargaining) because ex post contracts are incomplete.” Robert Gibbons, 
Transaction-Cost Economics: Past, Present and Future?, 112 SCANDINAVIAN J. ECON. 263, 268 (2010). 
2028 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 168: 2019 
structure of contracts between franchisors and franchisees, and the duration 
of contracts for the supply of coal and natural gas. 
However, when efficiency calls for substantial investments in specific assets, 
there is no costless way to solve the holdup problem. Each of the three 
mechanisms above comes with its own costs. Vertical integration may deprive the 
downstream firm of the benefits of competition and innovation among input 
suppliers. Preserving flexibility, through dual sourcing or relying on standardized 
inputs, sacrifices some of the efficiencies associated with specific investments. 
The general theory of holdup does not predict that actual ex post holdups 
will be common, even in situations where the holdup problem is substantial. 
To the contrary, under the general theory of holdup, actual ex post holdups 
represent failures by market participants to efficiently structure their 
relationships. Indeed, transaction cost economics predicts that such failures 
will be relatively rare in stable, well-understood business settings with limited 
private information, at least for transactions between sophisticated parties 
taking place in economies where property rights are well-defined, contract 
law is well-developed, and contracts are reliably enforceable. But that does 
not mean that holdup is not a problem, or that successful efforts to avoid it 
by altering existing business relationships are costless. 
D. Empirical Support for the General Theory of Holdup 
An impressive body of empirical work supports the general theory of 
holdup described above. Literally hundreds of papers have been published in 
peer-reviewed journals developing and testing the general theory of holdup. 
As Robert Gibbons, one of the editors of the Handbook of Organizational 
Economics, stated in his article on transaction cost economics, “the huge body 
of TCE literature is overwhelmingly empirical.”28 
One extensive line of research uses transaction cost economics to explain 
the scope and incidence of vertical integration.29 Put differently, these papers 
use transaction cost economics to explain the “make vs. buy” decisions of 
firms. A closely related line of research uses transaction cost economics to 
explain how firms structure their contractual relationships. Shelanski and 
Klein provide an early survey of this literature.30 As they conclude, “Studies 
 
28 Id. at 273. 
29 See Josh Wright, Klein v. Coase III: Fisher Body-General Motors Again (and Again), TRUTH 
ON THE MARKET (Mar. 14, 2007), http://truthonthemarket.com/2007/03/14/klein-v-coase-iii-fisher-
body-general-motors-again-and-again/ [https://perma.cc/4Z8C-9FDN] (“The holdup theory and 
the relationship between asset specificity and vertical integration is perhaps the most empirically 
tested economic propositions [sic] of modern industrial organization.”). 
30 See Howard A. Shelanski & Peter G. Klein, Empirical Research in Transaction Cost Economics: 
A Review and Assessment, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 335, 341-50 (1995) (surveying “vertical integration, 
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that examine the make-or-buy decision and the structure of long-term 
contracts, in particular, overwhelmingly confirm transaction cost economic 
predictions.”31 Masten assembles some of the best early empirical articles on 
vertical integration and vertical contracting.32 Whinston notes that “TCE 
predicts that any increase in quasi-rents will increase the likelihood of vertical 
integration (a finding that is so far consistent with nearly all of the existing 
empirical literature).”33 Macher and Richtman reviewed “over 3,500 abstracts 
from which [they] obtained approximately 900 articles that empirically test 
some aspect of TCE theory.”34 After recognizing considerable variability in 
the quality of the empirical work that they surveyed, they concluded, “[e]ven 
so, the volume of our findings lend considerable support overall for the main 
predictions of TCE.”35 
In addition, there is an enormous amount of anecdotal evidence based on 
long-term contracts between sophisticated parties in situations where substantial 
specific investments are involved and the parties come to rely on each other. It 
is safe to say that anyone who has seen a good number of such contracts will 
confirm that they normally contain provisions by which one party obtains price 
and performance protections to limit opportunism by the other party. 
E. Actual Holdups Are Very Difficult to Measure 
As just noted, the extensive empirical support for the general theory of 
holdup consists primarily of studies showing that firms structure their 
relationships to avoid or minimize the adverse effects of holdup. Critically, 
the evidence does not involve quantifying the magnitude of actual ex post 
 
‘hybrid’ contracting modes, long-term commercial contracts, informal agreements, and franchise 
contracting”). 
31 Id. at 352. Shelanski and Klein note the presence of some conflicting evidence, but go on to 
say, “[t]aken as a whole, the body of empirical research in TCE shows that a good deal of economic 
activity aligns with transactions in the manner predicted by the theory.” Id. They then concur with 
Paul Joskow’s view that the empirical evidence in transaction cost economics is in “much better shape 
than much of the empirical work in industrial organization generally.” Id. (quoting Paul L. Joskow, 
The Role of Transaction Cost Economics in Antitrust and Public Utility Regulatory Policies, 7 J.L. ECON. 
& ORG. 53 (1991)). 
32 See CASE STUDIES IN CONTRACTING AND ORGANIZATION (Scott Masten, ed.) (1996). 
33 Michael D. Whinston, On the Transaction Cost Determinants of Vertical Integration, 19 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 1, 2 (2003). 
34 Jeffrey T. Macher & Barak D. Richman, Transaction Cost Economics: An Assessment of 
Empirical Research in the Social Sciences, 10 BUS. & POL. 1, 2 (2008). Macher and Richman are 
especially interested in the “reach of transaction cost applications in fields outside [industrial 
organization] economics and in a variety of social sciences.” Id. at 42-43. 
35 Id. at 43. See also Bresnahan & Levin, supra note 26, §3, at 862 (characterizing the empirical 
evidence as “quite favorable” for transaction-cost theory); Francine Lafontaine & Margaret Slade, 
Vertical Integration and Firm Boundaries: The Evidence, 45 J. ECON. LITERATURE 629, 658 (2007) 
(“[V]irtually all predictions from transaction-cost analysis appear to be borne out by the data.”). 
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holdups.36 Indeed, the empirical literature on holdup has relatively few 
documented examples of large-scale actual holdups.37 This will be important 
below when we turn to evaluating the empirical evidence regarding patent 
holdup in particular. 
Anticipating the arguments being made by those who deny that the patent 
holdup problem is real and significant, it is instructive to ask why the 
empirical literature on the general holdup problem has not proceeded by 
measuring the frequency or magnitude of actual holdups. 
In part this is for a very good conceptual reason: the theory predicts that 
market participants will structure their affairs to avoid or mitigate actual 
holdups. As stressed above, the social costs caused by the holdup problem can 
be large even if large-scale holdups are very infrequent. The validity of the 
general theory of holdup, and the importance of the holdup problem, do not 
hinge on the frequency or magnitude of actual holdups. 
But practical considerations also play a big role in explaining why the very 
large empirical literature on the holdup problem includes few documented 
instances of actual holdups. Even in situations where such holdups take place, 
they are exceedingly difficult for researchers to reliably detect and quantify. 
To see why, denote the holdup (ex post monopoly) price by 𝑃𝑃! and the ex 
ante competitive price by 𝑃𝑃∗. The (per-unit) magnitude of the actual ex post 
holdup is equal to (𝑃𝑃! − 𝑃𝑃∗). Measuring either component of this difference 
can pose quite a challenge for researchers. Actual transaction prices in 
complex business-to-business transactions are rarely observable by 
researchers. Plus, even when a measure of price is available, it typically is 
confounded by other terms and conditions, making 𝑃𝑃! very hard to observe. 
Coming up with a good measure of the competitive benchmark price 𝑃𝑃∗ is 
even harder, since it reflects a counterfactual and since the transactions at 
issue are by nature idiosyncratic. Practical considerations also explain why the 
empirical literature on the holdup problem includes few documented 
instances in which the prospect of holdup has discouraged investment. The 
resulting reduction in investment typically will not normally be observable to 
researchers, much less attributable to holdup. 
 
36 Lafontaine and Slade explain that empirical work regarding inter-firm contracts has been 
quite successful at explaining the incidence of various practices, but less successful at quantifying the 
effects of these practices, primarily because such quantification would require access to data that is 
typically proprietary. Francine Lafontaine & Margaret E. Slade, Inter-Firm Contracts, in THE 
HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATIONAL ECONOMICS §3.2 (Robert Gibbons & John Roberts eds., 2013). 
37 Perhaps the most famous example involves General Motors and Fisher Body. See Benjamin 
Klein, Fisher-General Motors and the Nature of the Firm, 43 J.L. & ECON. 105, 106-26 (2000) (detailing 
Fisher Body’s holdup of General Motors after General Motor’s demand for Fisher’s products exceeded 
supply). Yet even this famous example is hotly disputed as a factual matter. See Ramon Casadesus-
Masanell & Daniel F. Spulber, The Fable of Fisher Body, 43 J.L. & ECON. 67, 76 (2000) (“[A] number of 
significant aspects of the [Fisher Body] account in the economics literature are incorrect.”). 
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For all of these reasons, scholars studying the holdup problem widely agree 
that the general theory of holdup is very well supported empirically without 
expecting, much less demanding, a body of empirical work measuring actual 
holdups. This same sensible approach should be applied to patent holdup. 
When we turn to look at patent holdup below, we will examine the two 
types of evidence used in the more general empirical literature on holdup. 
First, we look for evidence identifying situations in which the patent holdup 
problem is significant. The telltale marker that the patent holdup problem is 
significant in a given setting is the presence of substantial investments specific 
to a given patent or patent portfolio. Second, we look for evidence that the 
mechanisms used to manage the patent holdup problem are costly or 
imperfect. There is clear evidence that the mechanisms used by SSOs to 
manage SEP holdup are costly and imperfect. 
F. The Role of Antitrust in Limiting Holdup Generally 
Antitrust can assist contract law and other private arrangements to limit 
holdup in some circumstances. In many cases, holdup is purely a private matter 
involving two parties, such as a landlord and a tenant, or a coal mine and a 
railroad. In those cases, where holdup or its prospect does not have marketwide 
effects and does not harm third parties, antitrust is generally unnecessary. 
Other legal doctrines, including contract law, criminal and civil antifraud laws, 
and tort law, suffice. Furthermore, antitrust law must be careful not to impede 
private solutions to the holdup problem, as when rivals engage in cross licensing 
to allow themselves greater freedom to design new products.38 However, when 
holdup has marketwide effects that cause harm to third parties, including 
consumers, antitrust has a role to play in preventing holdup. Antitrust law is 
especially needed when the incidence of holdup falls on downstream customers 
rather than intermediaries. This can occur when a platform company follows 
an “open early, closed late” strategy, building its market position with a promise 
of openness that it later breaches.39 Such a policy standing alone might not 
violate the antitrust law; it could simply be contractual opportunism.40 But both 
deliberate misrepresentations that a standard will remain open and breach of a 
 
38 See Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting, in 
1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 120, 130 (Adam B. Jaffe, Josh Lerner & Scott Stern eds., 
2000) (“From the perspective of competition policy, cross licenses of this sort are quite attractive.”). 
39 See Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Could Java Change Everything? The Competitive 
Propriety of a Proprietary Standard, 43 ANTITRUST BULL. 715, 770-71 (1998) (discussing the risk that 
Java would gain popularity as an open platform and then close the platform). That risk came to pass; 
Oracle bought Sun and closed Java. For a discussion of the costs faced by consumers locked in by 
this “open early, closed late” strategy, see CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION 
RULES 103-34 (1999). 
40 Lemley & McGowan, supra note 39. 
2032 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 168: 2019 
contractual commitment to keep it open can serve to interfere with competition 
in a way antitrust law should care about. 
The role of antitrust in limiting holdup has been explored extensively in 
the antitrust treatment of practices involving aftermarkets. Consider a 
manufacturer of a durable good that competes with other manufacturers by 
promising not to discriminate against third parties who service its equipment, 
so customers can be assured of competition in the aftermarket to service the 
equipment. This is a contractual solution to the holdup problem faced by 
customers. Suppose, after building up an installed base of users, this 
manufacturer breaches that commitment and monopolizes the aftermarket for 
servicing the equipment, perhaps as part of a strategy to harvest the installed 
base through inflated service charges while exiting the equipment market. 
That type of breach of contract is likely to harm customers by disrupting the 
competitive process. Those are the key elements of an antitrust violation.41 
Antitrust also can guard against deceptive practices that undermine 
various contractual and organizational mechanisms designed to prevent 
holdup. Parties seeking to benefit from holdup may engage in fraud or other 
deceptive or misleading conduct that prevents third parties, including 
consumers, from enjoying the benefits of competition or from creating 
efficient private arrangements to avoid holdup. For example, they may 
conceal information ex ante in order to avoid triggering a negotiation until 
after their power is locked in, as Unocal and Rambus both did in hiding their 
patents from standard-setting organizations.42 Antitrust prohibits that 
misbehavior, ensuring that parties have the information and ability to 
contract privately to avoid holdup. 
II. PATENT HOLDUP 
A. Theory of Patent Holdup 
Patent holdup is a specific application of the general theory of holdup. 
When an actual ex post patent holdup occurs in the form of a patent license, 
its (per-unit) magnitude equals the difference between the royalty rate 
obtained by the patent holder and the royalty rate the patent holder would 
have been able to negotiate prior to the licensee making investments specific 
 
41 For a real-life example of this type of fact pattern, see Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. 
Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992). 
42 See Rambus Inc. v. FTC, 522 F.3d 456, 459 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (reporting the FTC’s findings 
that Rambus “deceptively failed to disclose” its patent interests in four standardized technologies); 
Union Oil Co. of California, 140 F.T.C. 123, 125 (2005) (alleging that Union Oil pursued patents 
while misrepresenting to regulatory authority that the relevant research was in the public domain). 
Shapiro testified on behalf of the FTC in the Unocal case. 
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to practicing the patent. The royalty rate without holdup reflects the intrinsic 
value of the patented invention, which will be large for major inventions. 
Nothing we say should be taken to suggest that a patent holder should be 
prevented from obtaining the reasonable royalty rate that reflects the ex ante 
incremental value of its inventions, properly discounted to reflect the chance 
that the patent is invalid or not infringed.43 Rather, our concern is with the 
ability of patent owners to capture more than that intrinsic value by 
exploiting the irreversible investments made by the licensee. 
Patent holdup, like all holdup, arises when products and services require 
specific investments. In this context, an investment to develop a new product 
is “specific” to a given patent to the extent that it cannot readily be transferred 
to a product that does not infringe that patent.44 If the patent holder owns a 
whole portfolio of patents, an investment to develop the new product is 
“specific” to that portfolio if it cannot be transferred to a product that avoids 
infringing the entire portfolio of patents.45 
Due to the probabilistic nature of patents, patent holdup does not require 
surprise or ambush: it can occur even if the firm developing a new product is 
well informed and able to negotiate with the patent holder before making any 
specific investments. We prove this as theoretical matter in a simple 
bargaining model in prior work.46 Patent holdup without surprise can occur 
because both outside options available to the firm developing the new 
product, in its ex ante negotiation with the patent holder, are costly to that 
firm. The first outside option is to design its new product to avoid any danger 
of later being found to infringe the patent. The cost of designing around the 
patent is the same, regardless of the probability that the patent will later be 
found invalid or not infringed by the new product. As a result, the royalties 
paid by a firm negotiating based on this outside option will be unreasonably 
high, especially for weak patents. The second outside option is to proceed 
ahead with product development and face the possibility of later being found 
to infringe the patent. But invoking this option negates the value to the 
downstream firm of knowing about the patent in advance and leaves that firm 
 
43 See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 
1991, 1999 (2007) [hereinafter Lemley & Shapiro, Patent Holdup] (“[T]he [reasonable and expected] 
royalty rate must be discounted to reflect patent strength.”). 
44 In many cases, an infringing product can be redesigned to avoid infringing, but this process 
takes time, so it does not avoid holdup altogether. 
45 This assessment must be based on the patent portfolios that will be in place after the firm 
introduces its product. Patent holdup can arise, or become more severe, due to a horizontal 
consolidation of patents reading on the firm’s product, or because a practicing entity who would not 
assert its patents due to the cost of a countersuit sells its patents to a Patent Assertion Entity (PAE). 
46 See Lemley & Shapiro, Patent Holdup, supra note 43, at 2003-05 (setting forth the “early 
negotiation” model); Carl Shapiro, Injunctions, Hold-Up, and Patent Royalties, 12 AM. L. & ECON. 
REV. 280, 298-300 (2010) [hereinafter Shapiro, Injunctions] (same). 
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vulnerable to ex post holdup. As a result, negotiating based on this outside 
option also leads to unreasonably high royalties.47 
Based on the general theory of holdup and the results just described, the 
danger of patent holdup is greatest when (1) a firm is developing a new 
product that may (or may not) later be found to infringe a patent, and (2) 
efficient development of that new product requires that firm to make 
substantial investments that are specific to the patent(s) in question. Patent 
holdup does not require “surprise” and can be especially problematic for 
vague or weak patents. Furthermore, the patent holdup problem is 
exacerbated if multiple firms own such patents, leading to royalty stacking.48 
Notably, the harm caused by the holdup problem here often does not take the 
form of an injunction shutting down a product for patent infringement. 
Rather, its most common form is the payment of unreasonably high royalties 
to the patentee to avoid the costly and inefficient measures to avoid the 
holdup that patentee could otherwise impose. 
B. Evidence of Patent Holdup 
We now turn to the empirical evidence relating to patent holdup. We 
address both categories of evidence identified above relating to the general 
theory of holdup. 
1. The Patent Holdup Problem Is Significant for Many High-Tech Products 
Large patent-specific investments are common in the information and 
communications technology (ICT) sector.49 When SEPs covering widely 
used compatibility standards are involved, the presence of large specific 
investments surely is the norm. After all, any investment that would be lost 
if the infringing firm were forced to stop selling all of its compatible products 
is specific to even a single SEP. 
The significance of patent-specific investments in any particular patent 
infringement case is an empirical question that depends upon the facts of that 
case. In an individual case where a party is arguing that it is subject to ex post 
patent holdup, that party should be required to establish that it has made 
significant investments specific to the patent or patent portfolio in question.50 
 
47 For a fuller discussion of this point, see Shapiro, Injunctions, supra note 46. 
48 Lemley & Shapiro, Patent Holdup, supra note 43. 
49 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 1, at 3-4, 35-36 (explaining that the ITC sector relies on 
a variety of patented technologies that must be licensed or designed around); U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & 
FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 1, at 43 n.50 (noting the costly nature of SEPs in the ICT sector). 
50 This assessment should be made under the assumption that the patent(s) involved are valid 
and infringed. Additionally, a party seeking in advance to avoid patent holdup may argue that it will 
likely make such specific investments, or would do so in the absence of the threat of patent holdup. 
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In cases involving SEPs reading on widely used industry standards, 
noncompliant products are unlikely to be commercially viable, so it will 
normally be sufficient for the party to show that it has made significant 
investments specific to the product category in question. 
Notably, a company does not need to be aware of a particular patent to 
make an investment specific to that patent. Indeed, the vast majority of 
holdup cases (and indeed the vast majority of patent lawsuits) involve patents 
discovered only after the investment is made.51 The fact that the patent can 
be argued by its owner to cover the specific investment is what gives rise to 
the holdup problem. 
2. Managing the Patent Holdup Problem is Very Difficult for High-Tech 
Products 
The general theory of holdup suggests several mechanisms that a firm 
developing a new product might employ to protect itself from patent holdup. 
To be effective, these mechanisms must be deployed prior to the firm’s 
development effort. First, the firm might vertically integrate, which in the case 
of patent holdup would mean acquiring the patents in question. Second, the 
firm might sign a longterm contract, which in the case of patent holdup would 
mean entering into a long-term licensing contract with the patent holder prior 
to product development. Third, the firm might retain flexibility to use other 
inputs, which in the case of patent holdup would mean designing its product to 
allow it to easily and rapidly modify its product to avoid infringement. 
We do indeed see each of these responses in some cases, but the mechanisms 
normally used to limit holdup often do not work well to prevent patent holdup. 
This implies that the social costs caused by patent holdup also will be high. In 
prior work, we and others identify a number of factors that make it very 
difficult for firms developing new products in the information technology and 
communications sector to protect themselves from patent holdup:52 
• Broad Patents with Vague Boundaries. Many U.S. patents have broad 
claims with vague boundaries, making it difficult to determine in 
advance whether a new product will infringe them, especially since 
product development takes time and is uncertain.53 
 
51 See Christopher A. Cotropia & Mark A. Lemley, Copying in Patent Law, 87 N.C. L. REV. 
1421, 1442, 1446 (2009) (reporting that only 31.1% of patent infringement cases “involve[] allegations 
that the defendant was even aware of the patent before the lawsuit,” and the number was much 
smaller in the IT industries). 
52 See Lemley & Shapiro, Patent Holdup, supra note 43, at 1992 (noting that products in the 
ITC sector “can easily be covered by dozens or even hundreds of different patents”). 
53 JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, 
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 54-56 (2008). 
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• Uncertainty About Future Product Attributes. A firm developing a new 
product may not know its specific features until well down the 
development path.54 
• No Independent Invention Defense. A product infringes a patent even 
if the firm developed that product entirely on its own, as is the norm 
in patent infringement cases.55 
• Weak Patents. Nearly 75% of patent suits fail.56 Even the small number 
of cases that involve defendants aware of a patent at the time they 
invest often involve patents that should not have issued or that are 
been claimed to cover something they do not plausibly reach. A weak 
patent can give rise to patent holdup even if the firm is fully aware 
of that patent when it launches its development effort. 
• Patent Pendency Lags. Patents take 3-4 years to issue on average.57 
Even if a firm carefully reads all pertinent patent applications when 
they are published, and steers well clear of their claims, that firm can 
still be exposed to patent holdup due to the lag between a patent’s 
priority date and the publication of that patent application by the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO). That is 
especially true since patent applicants can and do modify their claims 
during the patent prosecution process to cover products they see 
being introduced in the market and ongoing standardization 
efforts.58 
• Patent Thickets. Many patents may plausibly be asserted against a 
single product, and these patents are likely to be held by multiple 
owners.59 
In certain other industries, by contrast, a firm planning to develop a new 
product can easily identify the single firm that owns strong, clear patents that 
 
54 Lemley & Shapiro, Patent Holdup, supra note 43. 
55 Cotropia & Lemley, supra note 51, at 1425-26. 
56 John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & David L. Schwartz, Understanding the Realities of Modern 
Patent Litigation, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1769, 1787-88 (2014). 
57 Mark A. Lemley, Fixing the Patent Office 11 n.43 (Stan. L. & Econ. Olin Working Paper, 
Paper No. 422, 2013), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2023958 [https://perma. 
cc/N5NE-YHWD]. 
58 In Kingsdown Medical Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., the Federal Circuit stated that “there 
is nothing improper, illegal or inequitable in filing a patent application for the purpose of obtaining 
a right to exclude a known competitor’s product from the market.” 863 F.2d 867, 874 (Fed. Cir. 
1988). “[N]or,” noted the Federal Circuit, “is it in any manner improper to amend or insert claims 
intended to cover a competitor’s product the applicant’s attorney has learned about during the 
prosecution of a patent application.” Id.; see also Mark A. Lemley & Kimberly A. Moore, Ending 
Abuse of Patent Continuations, 84 B.U. L. REV. 63, 69 (2004) (noting that firms use continuation 
applications to “track changes in the marketplace”). 
59 Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 35 (2005); 
Shapiro supra note 38, at 126. 
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are likely to be asserted against that product. In those situations, if entry 
raises joint profits, an ex ante licensing contract could work well. Thus, firms 
in industries like pharmaceuticals or medical devices tend to identify the 
(many fewer, more certain) holders of potentially critical patent rights and 
either negotiate a license up front or change the way they design their 
product. Most new high-tech products, and certainly those complying with 
popular industry standards, do not fit this more benign fact pattern. 
For all of these reasons, holdup tends to be a thornier problem in the 
information technology and telecommunications industries. As an illustrative 
example, there are strong reasons to believe that effectively avoiding patent 
holdup is more difficult for a firm developing a new industrial robot than in 
the typical bilateral holdup situation studied in the transaction cost 
economics literature, such as an electric utility building a new generating 
facility that relies on a specific mine to supply coal, or an entrepreneur 
opening a new franchise. The electric utility can enter into a long-term 
contract with the mine or acquire the mine if necessary. The entrepreneur can 
sign a detailed long-term contract with the franchisor. In contrast, for the 
reasons given above, the robot maker will have difficulty even identifying all 
of the (possibly thousands of) patents that might be asserted in the future 
against its new robot, many of which might not issue until the robot maker is 
well down the road in its development process. 
Furthermore, even for those patents that can confidently be identified in 
advance, there are substantial transaction costs associated with each of the 
three mechanisms normally used to avoid holdup. 
• Vertical Integration. Vertical integration is rarely a good solution for 
patent holdup. If one robot manufacturer purchases a group of 
patents and patent applications that are likely to be asserted against 
tomorrow’s robots, the danger of patent holdup may actually become 
greater for the other robot manufacturers.60 This suggests that patent 
holdup would best be mitigated overall if a group of robot 
manufacturers purchases these patents. However, that solution 
involves its own substantial transaction costs, not to mention 
potential antitrust exposure. Further, there are just too many patents 
to make this feasible in the information technology sector. 
• Long-Term Contracts. Long-term ex ante patent licensing contracts 
intended to cover future products involve substantial transaction 
costs. Our robot manufacturer is likely to have a relatively poor sense 
 
60 This can happen because a robot manufacturer asserting the patent is more likely than a 
non-practicing entity to be able to obtain an injunction against other robot manufacturers, and 
because one robot manufacturer gains by excluding or raising the costs of its rivals. These forces can 
be offset if the party subject to holdup has its own patents that can be asserted in a countersuit. 
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of what its future products will look like when it first begins 
developing them, yet that is the point in time when it must begin 
making substantial specific investments. Furthermore, it may be very 
difficult for the robot maker to identify all of the patents that might 
be asserted against its future products, or what the scope of those 
patents will be, especially for patent applications that have not yet 
been issued or that will later be filed as continuations. On top of that, 
there may well be multiple parties who have applied for patents that 
are likely to be asserted against the new robots, raising issues of 
royalty stacking, which multiplies the patent holdup problem. For all 
of these reasons, very few companies developing complex products 
in the information, technology, and communications area are able, as 
a practical matter, to “clear” their products by entering into ex ante 
licensing arrangements with most or all of the parties holding patents 
that might later be asserted against their new products.61 For SEPs, 
FRAND commitments seek to overcome these problems, but these 
commitments do not specify royalty rates and even if they are 
effective, enforcing them involves substantial transaction costs.62 
• Retaining Flexibility. Retaining flexibility during the development 
process so as to dodge possible infringement claims for the resulting 
product can be exceedingly difficult, especially given the large 
number of patents and their vague boundaries. Further, even if such 
flexibility could be achieved, it might be very costly in terms of 
reduced product performance or the need to deploy additional 
engineering resources. That is especially true when the patent is an 
SEP, since standardization is critical to many IT technologies. 
Those, too, are inefficiencies, which can lead to elevated royalty rates 
or cause other costs associated with mitigating patent holdup. 
To summarize, each of the three basic mechanisms for mitigating patent 
holdup—vertical integration, long-term contracts, and retaining flexibility—
faces greater obstacles when it comes to patent holdup in the high-tech sector 
than it does for more traditional types of holdup. 
Reputational concerns also can mitigate holdup to some degree. However, 
the reputation mechanism also performs relatively poorly in the context of 
patent licensing for a number of reasons. It is difficult to identify the patents 
that may be asserted against a new product. Licensing terms are typically kept 
 
61 For a fuller discussion of this patent preclearance dynamic, see William F. Lee & A. Douglas 
Melamed, Breaking the Vicious Cycle of Patent Damages, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 385, 404-09 (2016). 
62 This highlights the benefits of reducing those transaction costs, e.g., by clarifying the 
circumstances under which SEP holders can obtain injunctions and the meaning of the term 
“reasonable royalties.” See supra note 12. 
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secret. Reputational effects may operate with a significant delay. A patent 
holder’s incentives can change (as when an operating company fails and then 
aggressively monetizes its patents). And patent owners can and do sell their 
patents to Patent Assertion Entities (PAEs) to assert them aggressively.63 Plus, 
for SEPs, the standard-setting process can make it difficult for SSO 
participants to steer new standards clear of a firm that has behaved 
opportunistically in the past if that firm makes a FRAND commitment to the 
new standard. Reputation works only if you can avoid dealing with companies 
that behave unreasonably; that may not be possible if they own SEPs. 
The conclusion from this analysis is unambiguous: patent holdup is an 
especially thorny subspecies of holdup, making it especially costly and 
difficult for firms developing new complex products to protect themselves 
from patent holdup. 
C. Actual Patent Holdups Are Very Difficult to Measure 
As with holdup in general, quantifying the frequency and magnitude of 
actual patent holdups is very difficult as a practical matter and not a useful 
way of assessing the importance of the patent holdup problem. Rarely can 
researchers observe the ex post price, because patent licensing terms are 
normally confidential. Even when researchers can observe the license fees, 
they are often embedded in a complex agreement. And even in those rare 
cases where researchers can accurately observe the ex post price, they are 
unlikely to observe the ex ante price, making it difficult if not impossible to 
measure the magnitude of the holdup. 
Litigated cases also are problematic as a source of data to quantify the 
magnitude of actual patent holdups. A litigated case resulting in an award of 
reasonable royalties may well involve attempted holdup, but by definition it 
cannot provide smoking-gun evidence of actual holdup, at least if one accepts 
that the royalties awarded by the court are reasonable.64 Rather, at least since 
the Supreme Court eliminated the automatic entitlement to an injunction, 
litigation to judgment (which is rare) often reflects a refusal to give in to 
holdup by a defendant willing to take its chances in court. And the vast 
 
63 Indeed, PAEs typically find it valuable to develop a reputation for aggressively pursuing 
patent infringement claims. Fiona Scott Morton & Carl Shapiro, Patent Assertions: Are We Any Closer 
to Aligning Reward to Contribution?, in 16 INNOVATION POL’Y & ECON. 89, 91 (2016). 
64 Two recent SEP cases provide good examples of this fact pattern. In Microsoft v. Motorola, 
Judge Robart found that the reasonable royalties for Motorola’s SEPs were $1.8 million, a “tiny 
fraction” of the $4 billion that Motorola was seeking. David J. Teece & Edward F. Sherry, A Public 
Policy Evaluation of RAND Decisions in U.S. Courts, 1 CRITERION J. ON INNOVATION 113, 119 (2016). 
In the Innovatio case, Judge Holderman found that the reasonable royalties were 9.56¢ per unit, a 
tiny fraction of the $36 per unit demanded for a bar code scanner. In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC, 
MDL No. 2303, 2013 WL 5593609 at *3, *12 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2013). 
2040 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 168: 2019 
majority of patent cases settle. The terms of a settlement are rarely 
observable, so it is impossible to know whether those settlements reflected 
the value of holdup. 
Notwithstanding these points, a number of authors have pointed to a lack 
of empirical evidence to argue that patent holdup either does not exist or is 
not a significant problem.65 Even taken on their own terms, many of these 
papers are deeply flawed. One such paper, which has often been cited by those 
who downplay the importance of patent holdup, purports to offer empirical 
evidence inconsistent with the hypothesis that SEP holdup has slowed 
innovation or harmed consumers.66 The conclusion to this Qualcomm-funded 
paper states, “[w]e cannot reject the hypothesis of no SEP holdup.”67 How do 
these authors reach this conclusion? They compare rates of change of quality-
adjusted prices in “SEP-reliant” industries with “similar” non-SEP-reliant 
industries, primarily over the 1997-2013 period.68 For example, they show that 
quality-adjusted prices of cellular phones have fallen faster than the quality-
adjusted prices of automobiles.69 This exercise does not address the relevant 
hypothesis: whether SEP holdup increased the price of cellular phones from 
what it otherwise would have been.70 The quality-adjusted prices of 
 
65 See, e.g., Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Comment on the Japan Fair Trade 
Commission’s Draft Partial Amendment to the Guidelines for the Use of Intellectual Property Under 
the Antimonopoly Act 3-7 (Aug. 3, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/
public_statements/693631/150803japantradecomments.pdf [https://perma.cc/2XG9-7RFZ] (“There is 
no empirical evidence that anticompetitive patent holdup is prevalent.”); see also Anne Layne-Farrar, 
Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking Theory and Evidence: Where Do We Stand After 15 Years of History?, 
at 2, DAF/COMP/WD(2014)84 (Nov. 18, 2014), http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/
publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DAF/COMP/WD(2014)84&doclanguage=en [https://perma.cc/ 
5BCN-W979] (“[T]he empirical studies conducted thus far have not shown that holdup or royalty 
stacking is a common problem in practice.”). 
66 See Alexander Galetovic, Stephen Haber & Ross Levine, An Empirical Examination of Patent 
Holdup, 11 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 549, 551-54 (2015) (finding no empirical support for the 
notion that SEP holdup hypothesis has slowed innovation or harmed consumers). 
67 Id. at 572. 
68 Id. at 551-52. They also attempt to test for SEP holdup by asking whether the eBay decision 
differentially affected the rate of change of quality-adjusted prices in SEP-reliant industries and 
non-SEP-reliant industries. Id. at 555. This test, too, has exceptionally low power, given the lags in 
the system and the many other factors that affect the rate of change of quality-adjusted prices. Worse 
yet, the basic assumption behind the test—that eBay had a greater impact on SEPs than on other 
types of patents—is highly questionable. More likely, eBay had a greater effect on non-SEPs than on 
SEPs. Prior to the eBay decision, FRAND commitments already limited the use of injunctions for 
SEPs, while non-SEPs automatically received injunctions. 
69 Id. at 564-66. The original version of this paper used the price of bananas as a “comparable” 
benchmark. Alexander Galetovic, Stephen Haber & Ross Levine, Patent Holdup: Do Patent Holders Holdup 
Innovation? 4 (Hoover Inst. Working Grp. on Intellectual Prop., Innovation, and Prosperity, No. 14011, 2014), 
https://hooverip2.org/wp-content/uploads/ip2-wp14011-paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/TG7F-MSYA]. 
70 See Alexander Galetovic, Stephen Haber, & Ross Levine, An Empirical Examination of Patent 
Hold-Up 9 (NBER Working Paper No. 21090, 2015), http://www.nber.org/papers/w21090 
[https://perma.cc/99ZL-UN2M] (acknowledging that “the equilibrium outcome of the SEP hold-
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pharmaceuticals have risen much faster than automobiles over the same 
period of time, but that similarly is not proof that pharmaceuticals are subject 
to a patent holdup problem. 
Beyond the obvious and fatal flaws in this empirical work,71 the whole line 
of inquiry is of limited relevance for the purpose of measuring the social costs 
of holdup or designing institutions to limit patent holdup, because it only 
looks for instances of actual patent holdup. As explained above, these 
instances are very difficult to detect and are only the tip of the iceberg in 
terms of the social costs of patent holdup.72 So far as we can tell, the vast 
majority of these papers have been funded by Qualcomm and other patent 
holders seeking to weaken the institutions designed to control patent holdup, 
increase their leverage in licensing negotiations, and thus increase their 
ability to monetize their patents.73 
 
up hypothesis is that consumers either face higher prices or lower quality products than they would 
if hold-up was not taking place”). 
71 More recent work fares no better. One recent paper claims to have counted up all the 
royalties on phones worldwide and found that they amount to only 3% of the price of a phone. 
Alexander Galetovic, Stephen Haber & Lew Zaretzki, An Estimate of the Average Cumulative Royalty 
Yield in the World Mobile Phone Industry: Theory, Measurement and Results, 42 TELECOMM. POL’Y 263, 
271-72 (2018). But the authors reach that conclusion only by ignoring the value of patents owned by 
companies that make phones or phone components, which collectively own the largest number and 
likely the most valuable patents. See Lemley & Melamed, supra note 9, at 2130 (noting that 
“smartphone companies alone spent over $15 billion acquiring patents” over the course of a few 
years). Even apart from that huge omission, their data are suspect, since later court evidence revealed 
that just one company—Qualcomm—charged 3% across the board for its patents alone. FTC v. 
Qualcomm Inc., 411 F. Supp. 3d 658, 673 (N.D. Cal. 2019). 
72 See Thomas F. Cotter et al., Demystifying Patent Holdup, 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1501, 1547-
48 (2019) (noting that patent holdup can be a problem even if it isn’t systemic, and that “it may be 
that case law imposing limits on the entry of injunctions is itself a leading factor constraining firms 
from engaging in holdup”). 
73 To be sure, companies on both sides have funded work in this area. But Qualcomm’s investment 
has been extraordinary and has led to the creation of entire centers as well as funding scholarly papers. 
See, e.g., Roger G. Brooks & Damien Geradin, Interpreting and Enforcing the Voluntary FRAND 
Commitment 9 INT’L J. IT STANDARDS & STANDARDIZATION RES. 1 (2011) (acknowledging that the 
author previously represented Qualcomm); Roger G. Brooks, Patent “Hold-Up,” Standards-Setting 
Organizations and the FTC’s Campaign Against Innovators, 39 AIPLA Q.J. 435, 435 (2011) (acknowledging 
that the author was representing Qualcomm in litigation pending when the article was written); 
Damien Geradin, Anne Layne-Farrar & A. Jorge Padilla, The Complements Problem Within Standard 
Setting: Assessing the Evidence On Royalty Stacking, 14 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 144, 144 (2008) 
(acknowledging financial support from Qualcomm); Haksoo Ko, Facilitating Negotiation for Licensing 
Standard-Essential Patents in the Shadow of Injunctive Relief Possibilities, 22 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 209, 
209 (2014) (acknowledging financial support from Qualcomm); Anne Layne-Farrar, Gerard Llobet & 
Jorge Padilla, Payments and Participation: The Incentives to Join Cooperative Standard Setting Efforts, 23 J. 
ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 24, 24 (2014) (acknowledging financial support from Qualcomm); Anne 
Layne-Farrar, Gerard Llobet & A. Jorge Padilla, Preventing Patent Hold Up: An Economic Assessment of 
Ex Ante Licensing Negotiations in Standard Setting, 37 AIPLA Q.J. 445, 445 (2009) (acknowledging 
financial support from Qualcomm); Anne Layne-Farrar, A. Jorge Padilla & Richard Schmalensee, 
Pricing Patents for Licensing in Standard-Setting Organizations: Making Sense of FRAND Commitments, 74 
ANTITRUST L.J. 671, 671 (2007) (acknowledging financial support from Qualcomm); About, HOOVER 
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Despite the difficulties of observing the incidence and magnitude of actual 
patent holdups, we are able to observe the telltale signs of actual patent 
holdup. Transaction cost economics, and simple bargaining theory for that 
matter, tell us that actual patent holdup can be expected to occur when three 
conditions are present: (1) a firm has developed a new product independently; 
(2) that firm has made significant investments that are specific to one or more 
patents asserted against that product; and (3) the firm is not protected from 
patent holdup.74 As discussed above, conditions (1) and (2) are common in 
the high-tech sector, placing considerable weight on the institutions that 
protect firms from patent holdup. 
The presence of those institutions is itself evidence that the patent holdup 
problem is real and significant. As we noted in Part I, companies try to 
structure their transactions to avoid holdup, developing institutions for that 
purpose. As we have seen, the traditional market solutions do not work well 
for patents. In most industries, the central mechanisms limiting patent 
holdup come from patent law, namely the rules governing injunctions and 
patent damages. In the high-tech sector, companies have overwhelmingly 
turned to SSOs in an effort to obtain global commitments to an ex ante 
royalty, which appear in the form of FRAND commitments. The near-
universal recognition in the industry of the need for such a mechanism is 
strong evidence that companies view holdup as a problem they must build 
institutions to avoid. 
 
IP2, https://hooverip2.org/about/ [https://perma.cc/7U7Y-4H8W] (last visited May 20, 2020) 
(acknowledging financial support from Qualcomm); Qualcomm Gives $2 Million for Patent Research, NW. 
PRITZKER SCH. L. (Aug. 2013), https://www.law.northwestern.edu/campaign/gifts/qualcomm/ 
index.html [https://perma.cc/R8XL-ZGTL] (explaining that Qualcomm gave at $2 million gift “to 
establish the Project on Innovation Economics, research that will investigate the role of patents in 
incentivizing technological innovation); Supporters, CTR. FOR THE PROTECTION OF INTELL. PROP. 
https://cpip.gmu.edu/about/supporters/ [https://perma.cc/6ZL5-C7E2] (last visited May 20, 2020) 
(acknowledging financial support from Qualcomm); Leading US Technology Firm Substantially Invests in 
World-Class Fundamental Research at TILEC, TILEC NEWS (Apr. 26, 2007), 
https://uvtapp.uvt.nl/tsb11/nb.nb_lib.frmtoonnieuwsbrief?v_nieuwsbrief_id=10764&v_rubriek_id=0&
v_taal= [https://perma.cc/2ET3-CDAK] (acknowledging Qualcomm support); U.S. Telecom Firm 
Boosts Research Funds at Tilburg University Law and Economics Center Beneficiary, GO DUTCH, 
http://www.godutch.com/newspaper/index.php?id=1181 [https://perma.cc/V3YF-J6HM] (last visited 
June 2, 2020) (“Research Center TILEC, the Tilburg Law and Economics Center, has received almost 
€300,000 from American telecom company Qualcomm.”). 
74 As explained above, actual patent holdup also can be expected to occur even without 
“ambush” when a firm is anticipating making specific investments and cannot easily identify the 
patents that may be asserted against its new products or when the identified patents are relatively 
weak. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text. 
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D. FRAND Commitments for Standard-Essential Patents 
The danger of patent holdup is particularly high for SEPs that read on 
popular industry standards. The reason is not hard to see: the patents are by 
definition thought to be essential to work in the field.75 If compliance with a 
standard is essential to market success, as it often is in network markets, a 
company has no choice but to invest in assets that might later turn out to be 
subject to SEPs. Further, there is unambiguous evidence of substantial patent 
thickets for many patent standards, as measured by the number of declared 
SEPs for those standards.76 
Precisely because patent holdup is such a grave problem for SEPs, SSOs 
commonly, if not uniformly, require that participants agree to license any 
SEPs on FRAND terms.77 Indeed, the FRAND commitment itself 
developed as a response to anticompetitive conduct by patent owners that 
failed to disclose their claim to own rights in a standard and then demanded 
excessive royalties after the standard-setting organization was locked in.78 
There is a broad consensus that the primary purpose of these FRAND 
commitments is to prevent SEP holdup by ensuring that parties seeking to 
make, use, or sell products that comply with the standard are able to do so, 
provided they pay reasonable royalties for the required SEPs.79 
 
75 Whether they actually are essential is open to some debate. See Mark A. Lemley & Timothy 
Simcoe, How Essential Are Standard-Essential Patents?, 104 CORNELL L. REV. 607, 628-32 (2019) 
(“When SEPs are asserted in court, most of them turn out not to be infringed.”). 
76 See Brad Biddle, Andrew White & Sean Woods, How Many Standards in a Laptop? (And Other 
Empirical Questions) PROC. 2010 ITU-T KALEIDOSCOPE ACAD. CONF.  123, 123 (2010) (“identif[ying] 
251 technical interoperability standards implemented in a modern laptop”); Lemley & Shapiro, A Simple 
Approach, supra note 16, at 1158 (noting the thousands of patents claimed to be essential to smartphone 
technology); Ann Armstrong, Joseph J. Mueller & Timothy D. Syrett, The Smartphone Royalty Stack: 
Surveying Royalty Demand for the Components Within Modern Smartphones 7 (May 29, 2014) (unpublished 
manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2443848 [https://perma.cc/K2DE-
PA64] (“[O]ne estimate suggests that there are 250,000 current patents relevant to the modern 
smartphone.”). 
77 Much has been written about these FRAND policies. For a fine review, see generally Jorge 
L. Contreras, Technical Standards, Standards-Setting Organizations, and Intellectual Property: A Survey 
of the Literature (with an Emphasis on Empirical Approaches), in 2 RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE 
ECONOMICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (Peter Menell & David Schwartz eds., 2019). 
78 See Jorge L. Contreras, A Brief History of FRAND: Analyzing Current Debates in Standard 
Setting and Antitrust Through a Historical Lens, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 39, 42-44, 64-66 (2015) (“In 
response to the perceived threat of patent hold-up, many [standards-development organizations] 
have adopted formal policies that impose one or both of the following obligations on participants: 
(1) an obligation to disclose patents essential to implementation of a standard, and/or (2) an 
obligation to license such patents on FRAND terms.”). 
79 See Norman Siebrasse & Thomas F. Cotter, Judicially Determined FRAND Royalties, in THE 
CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF TECHNICAL STANDARDIZATION LAW (Jorge L. Contreas, ed., 2017); 
Thomas F. Cotter, Patent Holdup, Patent Remedies, and Antitrust Responses, 34 J. CORP. L. 1151, 1201 
(2009) (“SSOs have experimented with or considered various policies designed to minimize the risk 
of patent holdup . . . . [such as] requiring SSO members/patent owners to commit to licensing their 
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The widespread requirement that owners of SEPs commit to licensing 
them on FRAND terms is an application of the general theory of holdup. 
Firms developing products that will comply with an industry standard 
typically need to make very substantial investments that are specific to these 
SEPs. This makes SEP holdup an obvious danger. The general theory of 
holdup teaches us that market participants will migrate towards the most 
efficient way of avoiding or mitigating SEP holdup. What are their choices? 
Vertical integration cannot solve the SEP holdup problem, since the whole 
idea of standard setting is to enable many downstream firms to make compliant 
products, which requires practicing SEPs.80 For a standard to work, every firm 
needs access to every SEP; they cannot simply vertically integrate with some of 
the SEPs that read on that standard. Nor can product design flexibility solve 
the SEP holdup problem because a compliant product will infringe SEPs by 
definition.81 The best hope for dealing with SEP holdup is to rely on disclosure 
of SEPs together with some type of ex ante long-term contract. 
Enter FRAND commitments: promises made by all participants in a 
standards body that they will license all essential patents on “fair, reasonable, 
and nondiscriminatory terms.” Those ubiquitous commitments are evidence 
of an entire industry trying to protect itself from patent holdup. 
However, because FRAND commitments require collective action, and 
because SSOs typically operate on the basis of consensus, they are subject to 
their own substantial imperfections and transaction costs. In particular, the 
FRAND commitments called for by most SSOs are surprisingly vague given 
their critical role in limiting SEP holdup. The most common provision 
simply requires that SEP holders make irrevocable commitments to license 
their SEPs on reasonable and non-discriminatory terms, but does nothing to 
specify or limit those terms.82 Despite these obstacles, FRAND 
commitments can be made more explicit and more effective at preventing 
 
technology, if at all, on RAND terms.”); Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-
Setting Organizations, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1889, 1924-25 (2002) [hereinafter Lemley, Intellectual 
Property Rights] (“If an IP owner agrees to license its patents that cover a standard on reasonable and 
nondiscriminatory terms, others will assume that they are free to use that standard so long as they 
pay a reasonable royalty.”). 
80 Vertical integration can work to some degree, e.g., if a large downstream firm acquires a 
collection of SEPs. But other downstream firms would still need access to those SEPs on reasonable 
terms. A group of downstream firms could acquire a collection of SEPs, but again other downstream 
firms would still need access to those SEPs. Patent pools can help mitigate the SEP holdup problem, 
but downstream firms who are not pool members still need access to those SEPs on reasonable terms. 
81 Flexibility can help in some circumstances, e.g. by making certain aspects of the standard 
optional rather than mandatory, thereby reducing the number of SEPs. But mandatory elements are 
typically critical for an interoperability standard to work properly, and as a factual matter many 
SEPs read on these mandatory elements. 
82 For a survey of standard-setting organization rules relating to IP, see Lemley, Intellectual 
Property Rights, supra note 79. 
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SEP holdup, as exemplified by the recent salutary changes at the IEEE.83 
However, in this paper we simply take as given existing SSO policies, 
vagueness and all. For our purposes here, the key point is that these FRAND 
commitments are the central mechanism used by SSOs to address the 
problem of SEP holdup. We can apply the general theory of holdup to ask 
how well these FRAND commitments work to mitigate holdup. We also can 
apply the general theory of holdup to help us understand the economic 
effects, and formulate the best policy responses, when SEP owners breach 
their FRAND commitments. But the very fact that those commitments are 
ubiquitous is itself evidence of an entire industry seeking to mitigate a 
widespread holdup problem. 
Fortunately, United States courts have come to understand the critical 
role played by FRAND commitments in mitigating SEP holdup. Most 
notably, the Federal Circuit has explicitly found that the concept of 
reasonable royalties, as applied to SEPs, means the royalties that would be 
negotiated prior to the establishment of the standard rather than transferring 
to the patent owner the value of collective adoption of the standard.84 In 
addition, the Federal Circuit, applying eBay, has indicated that injunctions 
will normally not be available for SEPs: “[a] patentee subject to FRAND 
commitments may have difficulty establishing irreparable harm.”85 The Ninth 
Circuit has taken the same position.86 Nothing in these decisions prevents 
SEP owners from properly protecting themselves from non-paying users,but 
they do give force to the contractual mechanisms companies use to try to 
 
83 See IEEE-SA STANDARDS BOARD BYLAWS , supra note 12, at 4 (requiring all proposed 
IEEE standards to be accompanied by an assurance that any SEPs would be available for a 
reasonable royalty). Importantly, the IEEE rules also provide a mechanism for SEP owners to 
control holdout by patent users who refuse to pay reasonable royalties. Id. 
84 See Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1232 (Fed. Cir. 2014). The Federal 
Circuit laid out two “special” considerations for “dealing with SEPs.” Id. “First, the patented feature 
must be apportioned from all of the unpatented features reflected in the standard. Second, the 
patentee’s royalty must be premised on the value of the patented feature, not any value added 
by the standard’s adoption of the patented technology.” Id. As the Federal Circuit noted, “[t]hese 
steps are necessary to ensure that the royalty award is based on the incremental value that the 
patented invention adds to the product, not any value added by the standardization of that 
technology.” Id. (emphasis in original). 
85 Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2014). The Federal Circuit left 
open the possibility that an injunction may be warranted if the infringer refuses to pay a FRAND 
royalty. See Lemley & Shapiro, A Simple Approach, supra note 16, at 1144 (“The standard-essential 
patent owner may seek an injunction against an unwilling licensee.”). 
86 ”Implicit in such a sweeping promise is, at least arguably, a guarantee that the patent-holder 
will not take steps to keep would-be users from using the patented material, such as seeking an 
injunction, but will instead proffer licenses consistent with the commitment made.” Microsoft Corp. 
v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872, 884 (9th Cir. 2012). “Motorola, in its declarations to the ITU, 
promised to ‘grant a license to an unrestricted number of applicants on a worldwide, non-
discriminatory basis and on reasonable terms and conditions to use the patented material necessary’ 
to practice the ITU standards.” Id. 
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avoid holdup and replicate what a negotiation might look like absent 
irreversible investments. 
Another significant step to avoiding holdup was the Supreme Court’s 
decision in eBay v. MercExchange that successful patent holders were not 
automatically entitled to an injunction.87 Following eBay, the lower courts 
have generally ruled that non-practicing entities are normally entitled to 
reasonable royalties but not permanent injunctions because their interest is 
only in a reasonable license fee.88 While eBay did not eliminate the danger of 
patent holdup, it greatly reduced the scope of patent holdup, at least by non-
practicing entities. If a court will not grant an injunction, patent holdup is 
unlikely so long as reasonable royalties are calculated correctly. 
From the perspective of transaction cost economics, eBay was a huge step 
forward. The eBay case established a bundle of rights for patent owners that 
promotes innovation by balancing the twin goals of (1) rewarding invention by 
patent holders through suitable patent remedies, and (2) encouraging 
subsequent innovation and commercialization by reducing patent holdup. The 
Supreme Court’s ruling in eBay, coupled with the appellate court’s rulings on 
damages, have substantially reduced the danger of SEP holdup in 
conventional patent infringement actions by aligning the patentee’s remedies 
with the intrinsic value of its invention rather than allowing it to lay claim to 
the value of standardization itself.89 Unfortunately, however, these limitations 
on injunctions for SEPs do not apply to exclusion orders granted by the 
International Trade Commission (ITC). The ITC has the authority to sharply 
limit exclusion orders for SEPs if they are not in the public interest, but so far 
the ITC has not done so, despite urgings from the Department of Justice and 
the USPTO during the Obama Administration. In one highly visible case, the 
U.S. Trade Representative vetoed an ITC exclusion order for an SEP.90 
 
87 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 394 (2006). 
88 See Christopher B. Seaman, Permanent Injunctions in Patent Litigation After eBay: An 
Empirical Study, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1949, 1953 (“[D]istrict courts appear to have adopted a de facto 
rule against injunctive relief for [patent assertion entities] and other patent owners who do not 
directly compete in a product market against an infringer . . . .”); Kirti Gupta & Jay P. Kesan, 
Studying the Impact of eBay on Injunctive Relief in Patent Cases 1-2 (July 11, 2015) (unpublished 
manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2629399 [https://perma.cc/M5F9-
3ZEZ] (“[D]istrict courts [have] consistently denied permanent injunctions . . . in instances when 
the patent holder and the infringer are not direct competitors in a product market.”). 
89 The remaining prospect for holdup in these cases stems primarily from the possibility that 
the patent infringement damages awarded by the court will exceed the level of reasonable royalties. 
How often this happens, and why, is beyond the scope of this paper. 
90 See Froman, supra note 10; cf. Certain Electronic Devices, Including Wireless 
Communication Devices, Portable Music and Data Processing Devices, and Tablet Computers, Inv. 
No. 337-TA-794, USITC (June 4, 2013) (Final) (setting forth the original, vetoed exclusion order). 
For a discussion of ITC remedies involving SEPs, see Colleen V. Chien & Mark A. Lemley, Patent 
Holdup, the ITC, and the Public Interest, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 41-43 (2012). 
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E. The Patent Holdout Chimera 
Patent advocates have sought to deflect concerns about patent holdup not 
only by denying its existence but by concocting a supposedly parallel story of 
“patent holdout.” On this theory, patent owners are being deprived of the 
fruits of their R&D investments by implementers who copy their technology 
but refuse to pay. The idea is to tell a story that parallels patent holdup.91 
Patent holdout is incoherent as a theoretical matter and rejected as an 
empirical matter. Empirically, between 95% and 99% of patent defendants in 
the IT industry are not in fact copying anything.92 They are independent 
inventors.93 Indeed, as we have seen, it is quite often impossible to know 
whether someone else invented the same thing you did at around the same 
time until years after the fact. Coupled with the notorious vagueness of IT 
patents94 and the sheer number of them, patent holdout does not explain what 
goes on in the technology industry unless it means failing to predict which of 
500,000 patents, many of which you cannot see, will someday be asserted 
against technology you have developed yourself even though you have never 
heard of the inventor and they never built anything. That is not to say that 
there are never cases of deliberate copying, but they are a tiny fraction of 
patent suits in the IT industry. 
The problems with patent holdout run far deeper than that, however. 
According to the patent holdout theory, the patent holder is unfairly 
disadvantaged because it has incurred the sunk costs of developing its 
invention before it can negotiate with an alleged infringer. But this is 
precisely how innovation in the private sector is intended to work in the 
presence of a patent system. The reward to an inventor is based on the 
incremental value of its invention, not on the amount of money expended to 
achieve that invention or the risk involved.95 A major invention can earn 
enormous profits even if it did not involve large R&D expenditures, and a 
patented invention may have no commercial value, even if it was very 
expensive to develop. 
 
91 See, e.g., Luke Froeb & Mikhael Shor, Innovators, Implementers, and Two-Sided Hold-Up, 
ANTITRUST SOURCE, Aug. 2015, at 2 (“Just as implementers invest before knowing what end-
product demand will be, so too must innovators invest before knowing whether an innovation will 
be implemented.”). The authors consult on these issues for Ericsson, the owner of many SEPs. 
92 Cotropia & Lemley, supra note 51, at 1445-46. 
93 For a discussion of the prevalence of independent invention, see Mark A. Lemley, The Myth 
of the Sole Inventor, 110 MICH. L. REV. 709, 712-35 (2012); see also Carl Shapiro, Prior User Rights, 96 
INTELL. PROP. LITIG. & INNOVATION 92, 92 (2006) 
94 See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 53, at 54 (“Patent law often fails to provide good notice 
to innovators about the patent rights relevant to adoption of a new technology.”). 
95 Different systems are used in some circumstances. For example, the government can offer a 
prize for the first party to achieve a certain goal, or the government can directly fund private research 
or development efforts. 
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Those who express concerns about patent holdout seem to want to 
increase the returns to patent holders whose inventions add little or no 
incremental value. That’s simply not how the patent system works or is 
intended to work. Indeed, doing so would create perverse incentives for 
companies to seek patents with holdup power rather than to fund R&D 
programs leading to technological advances. 
The patent holdout theory boils down to a complaint that basing patent 
damages on reasonable royalties is not favorable enough to patent holders; that 
they should be entitled to capture all the social value that traces in some way to 
their technology.96 But no property gives its owner the right to all related social 
surplus, and no market works that way. On top of all that, the patent holdout 
view seems rooted in the stilted view that all innovation comes in the form of 
patents. That proposition is disproven by a large literature and impressive body 
of evidence showing that a great deal of the creation, adoption, and diffusion 
of new technologies does not take place in the form of patents.97 
Those pushing the theory of patent holdout as parallel to patent holdup 
also misunderstand the actual operation of the patent system. Patent holdup, 
like any kind of holdup, occurs because the party engaging in patent holdup, 
namely the patent owner, has the law on its side and can therefore shut down 
the defendant’s conduct unless the defendant pays a surcharge. But there is no 
similar legal right of the party supposedly engaging in patent holdout to 
infringe a patent. To the contrary, the law gives patent owners the right to sue 
for an injunction (if they are practicing entities) and, in any event, for damages 
adequate to compensate for the infringement.98 While courts may have 
difficulty calculating those damages, they tend to err on the side of paying 
patent owners too much, not too little.99 Plus, a defendant deliberately 
 
96 See Einer Elhauge, Do Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking Lead to Systematically Excessive 
Royalties?, 4 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 535, 541-45 (2008) (making this assumption). 
97 See, e.g., Richard C. Levin, Alvin K. Klevorick, Richard R. Nelson & Sidney G. Winter, 
Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and Development, 3 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. 
ACTIVITY, 783, 784, 793-96 (1987) (noting that certain industries primarily rely on non-patent means of 
appropriating returns); Wesley M. Cohen, Richard R. Nelson & John P. Walsh, Protecting Their Intellectual 
Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not) 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 7552, 2000),  https://www.nber.org/papers/w7552.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9RGS-9LYT] (finding that firms leverage their inventions via “secrecy, lead time 
advantages, and the use of complementary marketing and manufacturing capabilities”). See generally 1-2 
HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF INNOVATION, (Bronwyn H. Hall & Nathan Rosenberg eds., 2010). 
98 35 U.S.C. §§ 283, 284 (2018) (empowering courts to “grant injunctions in accordance with 
the principles of equity” and to award “damages adequate to compensate for . . . infringement”). 
99 See Mark A. Lemley, Distinguishing Lost Profits From Reasonable Royalties, 51 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 655, 656 (2009) (“[C]ourts have . . . artificially rais[ed] the reasonable royalty rate . . . in an 
effort to compensate patent owners.”); Brian J. Love, Note, Patentee Overcompensation and the Entire 
Market Value Rule, 60 STAN. L. REV. 263, 265 (2010) (“[Courts’] application of the entire market 
rule routinely overcompensates patentees.”).  
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infringing a patent must also pay punitive damages for willful infringement,100 
and often attorneys’ fees as well.101 Some companies may try to “hold out” by 
infringing a patent and refusing to pay reasonable royalties, but the law can 
and does call them to account for it. Patent holdout might be a worry if we did 
not have a patent system, but that system by design prevents patent holdout.102 
It is true that a group of companies might conspire together to drive down 
the price of inputs, just as they might form a cartel to raise their own prices. 
These “buyers’ cartels” are a legitimate worry of antitrust law.103 But a single 
company developing a product it made and defending itself in a later patent 
suit is not a buyers’ cartel. Nor is a group of companies that responds to the 
danger of patent holdup, not by refusing to pay or by setting an artificially 
low price, but by agreeing with the patent owners themselves to pay the price 
patent law would rightfully charge them anyway—a FRAND royalty. 
F. Summary 
So far, we have established the following propositions: 
 
• The theory of holdup predicts that the danger of holdup will be 
greatest for transactions involving large, specific investments, and 
that market participants will structure their affairs to minimize the 
costs associated with holdup, including mitigation costs. 
• The general theory of holdup has extensive empirical support in the 
academic literature. This empirical support comes primarily from 
observing situations in which market participants structure their 
relationships to mitigate the inefficiencies resulting from holdup. 
• Looking for the presence or absence of actual holdups in specific 
settings is not an effective way to test the theory of holdup. There 
may be little or no actual holdup in a given situation because market 
participants have effectively adopted strategies to mitigate or 
eliminate holdup. Furthermore, researchers usually lack the data 
necessary to quantify actual holdup, even when it occurs. 
 
100 See Halo Elecs. v. Pulse Elecs., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1932-34 (2016) (“[Punitive damages] should 
generally be reserved for egregious cases typified by willful misconduct.”). 
101 See Octane Fitness v. Icon Health & Fitness, 572 U.S. 545, 552 (2014) (explaining that 
attorneys’ fees are awarded in “exceptional” cases). As both Contreras and Cotter et. al. note, holdout 
essentially resolves to “willful patent infringement” the law already punishes. Contreras infra note 
136, at 895; Cotter et al. supra note 72, at 1551. 
102 True, patent litigation is expensive, and that makes litigation less attractive, particularly if 
the stakes are small. But that’s true for both plaintiffs and defendants. 
103 2 HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST 
PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW, §35.06 (3d ed. 2019). For an example 
of such a cartel, see Jones Knitting Corp. v. Morgan, 361 F.2d 451, 452, 459 (3d Cir. 1966). 
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• The conditions under which holdup is a danger apply with unusual 
force to patent holdup. The primary mechanisms market participants 
normally employ to mitigate holdup do not work well to mitigate 
patent holdup, especially in the information technology and 
telecommunications sector. 
• Holdup based on SEPs is an especially grave danger, due to the large 
number of declared SEPs and the magnitude of the investments that 
are specific to making products that comply with popular industry 
standards. Industry participants, well aware of this danger, generally 
require SEP owners to make FRAND commitments to mitigate the 
risk of SEP holdup. Injunctions are generally inconsistent with 
those commitments.104 The Supreme Court’s eBay decision, by 
limiting the availability of permanent injunctions, reduced the 
danger of patent holdup. 
• So-called patent holdout—by which people usually mean “patent 
infringement”—is adequately addressed by patent law and is in no 
way comparable to patent holdup. 
All of this implies and confirms that FRAND commitments play a major 
role in limiting SEP holdup. Efforts to make those commitments more 
effective should be welcomed so long as SEP owners are able to receive the 
reasonable royalties to which they are entitled. 
III. THE ROLE OF ANTITRUST IN POLICING HOLDUP 
A. Standard-Setting Organizations Have Long Been Recognized as 
Procompetitive 
Standard-setting organizations naturally raise antitrust issues, as they 
involve agreements among competitors affecting the manner in which they 
compete. Efforts by incumbent firms to use safety and performance standards 
to exclude new technologies were struck down by the Supreme Court in the 
1980s as violations of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, and properly so.105 
 
104 See Dan L. Burk, Punitive Patent Liability: A Comparative Examination, 37 REV. LITIG. 327, 
333, 338-39 (2018) (voicing concerns about a “bait-and-switch on the part of the patent holder who 
promised non-exclusive fair and reasonable terms but later demands injunctive exclusivity”); 
Michael A. Carrier, Why Property Law Does Not Support the Antitrust Abandonment of Standards, 57 
HOUS. L. REV. 265, 274 (2019) (praising courts for recognizing that injunctions involving SEPs 
should be issued with care). 
105 See Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc. 486 U.S. 492, 495-97, 501 (1988) 
(refusing to provide Noerr-Pennington immunity to firm that manipulated voting in SSO to shut out 
new manufacturer); Am. Soc’y of Mech. Eng’rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 559-64 
(1982) (holding SSO liable after it set forth a standards interpretation designed to shut out new 
manufacturer). 
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Antitrust attention has shifted to compatibility standards during the past 
twenty years as the importance of standard-setting in the high-tech sector has 
grown. The antitrust and scholarly consensus recognizes two important ways 
in which compatibility standards promote competition and benefit 
consumers.106 First, compatibility standards can give consumers the low 
prices, enhanced variety, and improved quality that result from competition, 
together with the large positive network effects associated with assured 
compatibility. A phone that can communicate with other phones is much 
more valuable than one that can’t, and a device that can access the Internet 
anywhere is much more valuable than one tethered to a particular company’s 
version of WiFi. As a consequence, SSO activities in furtherance of these 
goals should be evaluated using the rule of reason, not subject to per se liability 
under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 
Second, SSOs can promote the adoption of new technology by limiting 
patent holdup. As a consequence, SSO efforts to establish effective rules 
requiring SEP owners to license their SEPs on FRAND terms to all parties 
seeking to make or sell compliant devices promote innovation and are pro-
competitive. Indeed, it is breaches of these rules that can harm competition 
and consumers.107 This consensus reflects economic research relating to 
standard-setting, network effects, and innovation. The implication is not that 
compatibility SSOs are never problematic, but rather that setting standards 
and enforcing reasonable patent policies related to those standards promotes 
rather than impedes competition.108 
This consensus can be seen in numerous policy statements and 
enforcement actions by the FTC and the DOJ over the years.109 As one 
 
106 See Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust and the Internet Standardization Problem, 28 CONN. L. REV. 
1041, 1081 (1996) (discussing the benefits of compatibility standards). 
107 Lemley, Ten Things, supra note 15, at 156-58, 161. To serve this function, the “reasonable” in 
FRAND must refer to the reasonable royalties before the standard is established. Id. at 158. As 
discussed above, patent law moved decisively in this direction over the same time period. 
108 Indeed, Melamed and Shapiro have argued that joint standard setting without such policies 
may itself be anticompetitive. See Carl Shapiro & A. Douglas Melamed, How Antitrust Law Can 
Make FRAND Commitments More Effective, 127 YALE L.J. 2110 (2018). 
109 See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 1 at 194 (“A definition of RAND based on the 
ex ante value of the patented technology at the time the standard is set is necessary for consumers 
to benefit from competition among technologies to be incorporated into the standard . . . .”); U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 1 at 37 (“In light of these potential 
procompetitive benefits, the [DOJ and FTC] would generally expect to apply the rule of reason to 
evaluate conduct such as multilateral ex ante licensing negotiations or SSO requirements to disclose 
model licensing terms.”); Deborah Platt Majoras, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Recognizing the 
Procompetitive Potential of Royalty Discussions in Standard Setting, Prepared Remarks at 
Standardization and the Law: Developing the Golden Mean for Global Trade at Stanford University 
7 (Sept. 23, 2005), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/ 
recognizing-procompetitive-potential-royalty-discussions-standard-setting/050923stanford.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/S6TP-D7SX] (“[J]oint ex ante royalty discussions that are reasonably necessary 
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example, in 2006, the Antitrust Modernization Commission(AMC) made the 
following recommendation: “Joint negotiations with intellectual property 
owners by members of a standard-setting organization with respect to 
royalties prior to the establishment of the standard, without more, should be 
evaluated under the rule of reason.”110 Antitrust and patent agencies have 
followed this principle for many years.111 Notably, then-Commissioner Makan 
Delrahim, who now leads the Antitrust Division, dissented from the 
statement allowing ex ante royalty negotiations with the DVD standard.112 
B. The Trump Administration Reverses Course 
Under Assistant Attorney General Delrahim, the Antitrust Division has 
reversed course, dramatically changing its approach to SEPs and FRAND 
commitments. Some policy changes announced by the Antitrust Division 
weaken antitrust enforcement and thus make it easier for SEP holders to 
engage in patent holdup. Others threaten to use antitrust offensively to 
discourage market participants from protecting themselves from patent 
holdup. The FTC has not changed its policies, so there is now a yawning gap 
between the DOJ and the FTC on these issues.113 
 
to avoid hold up do not warrant per se condemnation. Rather, they merit the balancing undertaken 
in a rule of reason review.”). 
110 ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMMISSION 
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 13 (2007), https://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/
report_recommendation/amc_final_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/HFC4-LB67]. 
111 See supra note 109; Letter from Charles A. James, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
to Ky P. Ewing, Vinson & Elkins 8, 13 (Nov. 12, 2002), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files 
/atr/legacy/2006/04/27/200455.pdf [https://perma.cc/YAU5-GRPZ] (allowing ex ante royalty 
negotiation with 3GPP standard); Letter from Joel I. Klein, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t 
of Justice, to Gerrard R. Beeny, Esquire, Sullivan & Cromwell 11 (June 26, 1997), 
https://www.justice.gov/archive/atr/public/busreview/215742.pdf [https://perma.cc/9U8D-SVUH] 
(same with MPEG-2 standard); Letter from Joel I. Klein, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, to Gerrard R. Beeny, Esquire, Sullivan & Cromwell 13 (Dec. 16, 1998), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2006/04/27/2121.pdf [https://perma.cc/A7HM-
G6XN] (same with DVD standard). 
112 ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, supra note 110, at 407-09 (separate statement of 
Commissioner Delrahim). He also criticized the DOJ Business Review Letter to VITA because the 
Antitrust Division did not object to the VITA policy requiring SEP holders to disclose the 
maximum royalty rates they would charge for their SEPs. Id. at 409. 
113 See Brief for the United States of America as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant and Vacatur, Fed. 
Trade Comm’n v. Qualcomm Inc., 935 F.3d 752 (2019) (No. 19-16122), 2019 WL 3977818 (opposing the FTC’s 
enforcement action against Qualcomm); Joseph Simons, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Prepared Remarks 
at the Georgetown Law Global Antitrust Enforcement Symposium 6 (Sept. 25, 2018), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1413340/simons_georgetown_lunch_address_
9-25-18.pdf [https://perma.cc/PLQ4-LCF3] (acknowledging this gap and noting that “the FTC will continue 
our economically grounded and fact-based enforcement of the antitrust laws in [the standard-setting 
process]”). 
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The policy changes at the DOJ have been announced and communicated 
in a series of speeches given by Assistant Attorney General Delrahim starting 
in November 2017, shortly after he took office. His first speech addressing 
this topic is illustrative.114 That speech begins with his assertion that “The 
Hold-Out Problem Poses a More Serious Threat to Innovation than the 
Hold-Up Problem,”115 a claim we debunked above. He goes on to state flatly 
that “Antitrust Law Should Not Police FRAND Commitments to SSOs.”116 
In fact, however, the Division’s current policy contemplates antitrust 
intervention in standard-setting—but, shockingly, on the side of those who 
seek to avoid their FRAND commitments and engage in holdup. 
Based on a deeply misguided view of how technology competition works 
and the way in which the patent system functions, the Antitrust Division has 
put forward antitrust policies designed to favor SEP holders at the expense of 
other market participants, innovation, and, ultimately, consumers. The 
Division also has taken a number of actions to implement these policy changes. 
• The Antitrust Division sent a letter to the American National 
Standards Institute (ANSI) in March 2018 stating that “the Antitrust 
Division will . . . [therefore] be skeptical of rules that SSOs impose 
that appear designed specifically to shift bargaining leverage from IP 
creators to implementers, or vice versa.”117 This direct attack on SSO 
rules requiring FRAND commitments is explicitly based on the 
flawed patent holdout theory. 
• In December 2018, the DOJ withdrew from the joint DOJ/PTO 
policy position regarding SEPs and FRAND commitments,118 based 
in part on the following peculiar assertion by Delrahim: “A FRAND 
 
114 See Makan Delrahim, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Take It to the Limit: 
Respecting Innovation Incentives in the Application of Antitrust Law, Prepared Remarks at 
University of Southern California Gould School of Law (Nov. 10, 2017), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/file/1010746/download [https://perma.cc/9B7L-XSFC] 
[hereinafter Delrahim, Take It to the Limit]. 
115 Id. at 3. 
116 Id. at 7. 
117 Letter from Andrew C. Finch, Office of the Principal Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, to Patricia Griffin, Vice President & Gen. Counsel, & Amy Marasco, Chair, Am. 
Nat’l Standards Institute 1 (Mar. 7, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/atr/page/file/1043456/download 
[https://perma.cc/4ZJX-HVFJ] (quoting Delrahim, Take It to the Limit, supra note 114). 
118 Makan Delrahim, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, “Telegraph Road”: 
Incentivizing Innovation at the Intersection of Patent and Antitrust Law, Prepared Remarks at the 
19th Annual Berkeley-Stanford Advanced Patent Law Institute 7 (Dec. 7, 2018), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/file/1117686/download [https://perma.cc/HAK3-4VXV]. 
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commitment does not and should not create a compulsory license 
scheme.”119 In December 2019, it persuaded the PTO to do the same.120 
• In September 2020, the DOJ reversed its prior approval of the IEEE’s 
patent policies that established standards for setting a FRAND royalty. 
The new letter suggests that an SSO may violate the antitrust laws even 
if it establishes clear rules for determining what a FRAND royalty is, or 
requires a party to actually commit to a FRAND license and give up 
injunctive relief.121 
• Perhaps most notably, the DOJ has filed briefs attacking its sister 
antitrust agency, the Federal Trade Commission, for enforcing the 
antitrust laws against Qualcomm.122 
Together, these actions reflect a remarkable policy shift at the Antitrust 
Division, not only abandoning enforcement of the antitrust laws against SEP 
owners but also imposing antitrust risk on SSOs that enforce FRAND 
commitments or other policies designed to limit SEP holdup. 
There are two prongs to this attack. First, the Antitrust Division now takes 
the position that antitrust should not be used to control the monopoly power 
associated with SEPs by limiting patent holdup. According to Delrahim, 
“[f]irst, hold-up is fundamentally not an antitrust problem, and therefore 
antitrust law should not be used as a tool to police FRAND commitments that 
patent-holders make to standard setting organizations.”123 According to the 
Antitrust Division, even a SEP holder that gains a monopoly through 
deception at the SSO and subsequently exerts its monopoly power by 
breaching its FRAND commitment has not violated the Sherman Act.124 
 
119 Id. at 6. 
120 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE & NAT’L INST. OF 
STANDARDS & TECH., POLICY STATEMENT ON REMEDIES FOR STANDARDS-ESSENTIAL 
PATENTS SUBJECT TO VOLUNTARY F/RAND COMMITMENTS 3-4 (2019). 
121 Letter from Makan Delrahim, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Antitrust Div., to 
Sophia A. Muirhead, Gen. Couns. & Chief Compliance Off., Inst. Of Elec. & Elecs. Eng’rs, Inc. 
(Sept. 10, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/atr/page/file/1315291/download [https://perma.cc/ 
LJ3B-2WZP]. 
122 Brief for the United States of America as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant and Vacatur, 
FTC v. Qualcomm Inc., 935 F.3d 752 (2019) (No. 19-16122), 2019 WL 3977818. 
123 Makan Delrahim, Assistant Att’y Gen., The “New Madison” Approach to Antitrust and 
Intellectual Property Law, Prepared Remarks at the University of Pennsylvania Law School 5 (Mar. 
16, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/file/1044316/download [https://perma.cc/Y2EZ-
EGCT] [hereinafter Delrahim, “New Madison”]. 
124 Statement of Interest of the United States at 1-2, 7, 11-20, Cont’l Auto. Sys., Inc. v. Avanci 
LLC, No. 3:19-CV-02933-M (N.D. Tex. May 10, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/atr/case-
document/file/1253361/download [https://perma.cc/AKK6-2J79]. This amicus brief explicitly rejects 
the approach taken in Broadcom v. Qualcomm, 501 F. 3d 297 (3d Cir. 2007), under which obtaining a 
SEP monopoly by deception can violate the Sherman Act. Id. at 8. This brief is part of a series of 
cases in which the Antitrust Division has intervened, not to enforce the antitrust laws, but to oppose 
enforcement where SEPs are concerned. For other examples, see Brief for the United States of 
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Second, the Antitrust Division now takes the position that antitrust 
should stop SSOs from trying to prevent SEP holdup. According to 
Delrahim, “standard setting organizations should not become vehicles for 
concerted actions by market participants to skew conditions for patented 
technologies’ incorporation into a standard in favor of implementers because 
this can reduce incentives to innovate and encourage patent hold-out.”125 He 
further states that “because a key feature of patent rights is the right to 
exclude, standard setting organizations and courts should have a very high 
burden before they adopt rules that severely restrict that right or—even 
worse—amount to a de facto compulsory licensing scheme.”126 He appears to 
include a FRAND commitment in the list of things that face a “very 
high burden.”127 
These policies are a sharp reversal from the positions long taken by the 
DOJ and the FTC, as well as the European Commission.128 Sadly, they rest 
heavily on the deeply flawed concept of patent holdout and on the specious 
arguments dismissing patent holdup discussed above. By embracing the 
patent holdout narrative and downplaying the dangers of patent holdup, the 
Antitrust Division’s new policies risk undoing the progress courts and SSOs 
have made in bringing SEP holdup under control. 
C. A Limited Role for Antitrust in Promoting, Not Impeding, Competition 
We favor an important but limited role for antitrust to control patent 
holdup. One of the authors has previously expressed skepticism of broad 
antitrust enforcement against patent holdup.129 But the critical point Lemley 
made there is that, for the most part, we do not need antitrust if patent and 
contract law effectively enforce the private solutions SSOs have developed to 
 
America as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party, HTC Corp. v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM 
Ericsson, No. 19-40566 (5th Cir. Oct. 20, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/atr/case-
document/file/1214541/download [https://perma.cc/ZBL7-QCBA]; Statement of Interest of the 
United States, Lenovo Inc. v. IPCOM GMBH & Co., No. 5:19-cv-01389-EJD (N.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 
2019), https://www.justice.gov/atr/case-document/file/1213856/ download [https://perma.cc/LR6G-
ZQH5]. 
125 Delrahim, “New Madison”, supra note 123, at 5. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. 
128 See Case C-170/13, Huawei Techs. Co. vs. ZTE Corp., EU:C:2015:477 at 10-11 (July 16, 2015) 
(requiring SEP owners to offer FRAND licenses to alleged infringers willing to license); Eur. 
Comm’n, Setting Out the EU Approach to Standard Essential Patents, at 6-7, COM (2017) 712 final (Nov. 
29, 2017), https://ec.europa.eu/docsroom/documents/26583 [https://perma.cc/6BUR-JREY] 
(encouraging “FRAND licensing terms for SEPs” and setting forth comprehensive guidance for 
such terms). 
129 See Lemley, Ten Things, supra note 15, at 161 (arguing that antitrust law should “permit SSO 
members the latitude to discuss royalty rates collectively before the standard is set” and “even allow 
SSOs to impose a step-down royalty scheme”). 
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the holdup problem.130 In his more temperate moments, Delrahim adds an 
important caveat that, if taken seriously, might align him more with us: 
“[A]ntitrust law should play no role in policing unilateral FRAND 
commitments where contract or common law remedies would be adequate.”131 
Unfortunately, he seemed to drop that caveat in the joint December 2019 
statement with the PTO abandoning long-standing policy on FRAND 
commitments. There, the Division and the PTO took the position that 
patentees should be entitled to a full range of patent remedies, explicitly 
including injunctions, even if they had committed to license the patents on FRAND 
terms.132 As Herbert Hovenkamp has noted, the Justice Department’s position 
contradicts established law on injunctive relief and FRAND.133 
Even the more limited version of the statement is problematic. If courts 
effectively enforce FRAND commitments, most of the holdup problem can 
be solved without resort to antitrust. But antitrust still has an important role 
to play when contract law and anti-fraud laws fail to fully address the patent 
holdup problem.134  
The FTC’s case against Qualcomm provides a good example of why 
antitrust is needed. In that case, the District Court found that Qualcomm had 
breached its FRAND commitment and used its monopoly power over 
modem chips to pressure its customers (Original Equipment Manufacturers, 
or “OEMs”) to pay a royalty surcharge for Qualcomm’s SEPs on top of the 
reasonable royalty rates that Qualcomm would otherwise have been able to 
obtain. Qualcomm imposed this surcharge when Qualcomm’s customers 
purchased modem chips from Qualcomm’s rivals.135 The District Court 
correctly found that Qualcomm’s royalty surcharge acted like a tax when 
Qualcomm’s customers purchased modem chips from Qualcomm’s rivals.136 
Based on this reasoning, the District Court correctly found that Qualcomm’s 
“no-license/no-chips” policy harmed competition by raising rivals’ costs and 
 
130 Id. 
131 Delrahim, “New Madison”, supra note 123, at 9 (emphasis added). 
132 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE & NAT’L INST. OF 
STANDARDS & TECH., supra note 120, at 4. 
133 Herbert Hovenkamp, Justice Department’s New Position on Patents, Standard Setting, and 
Injunctions, REG. REV. (Jan. 6, 2019), https://www.theregreview.org/2020/01/06/hovenkamp-justice-
department-new-position-patents-standard-setting-injunctions/ [https://perma.cc/X66L-FFLF]. 
134 See Herbert Hovenkamp, FRAND and Antitrust, CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) 
(manuscript at 1-2), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3420925 [https://perma.cc/ 
4G68-HK3S] (considering circumstances when antitrust enforcement is necessary and denouncing 
the position that contract makes antitrust enforcement entirely unnecessary as “extreme”). 
135 FTC v. Qualcomm Inc., 411 F. Supp. 3d 658, 698 (N.D. Cal. 2019). 
136 See FTC v. Qualcomm, Inc., 935 F. 3d 752, 756 n.1 (“The theory . . . adopted by the district 
court [was] that Qualcomm’s royalty rates operate as an exclusionary tax or surcharge on competitor 
products.”). Shapiro’s trial testimony on behalf of the FTC emphasized this basic economics 
concept.  
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thereby excluding them, and that this same conduct also harmed Qualcomm’s 
customers.137   
The Ninth Circuit reversed, making basic errors of both economics and 
law.138 On the economics, the Ninth Circuit mistakenly concluded that 
“Qualcomm’s royalties are ‘chip-supplier neutral’ because Qualcomm collects 
them from all OEMs that license its patents, not just ‘rival’s customers.’”139 
This is flatly incorrect, because the royalty surcharge reduces the gains from 
trade between an OEM and a rival modem-chip supplier but does not reduce 
the gains from trade between the OEM and Qualcomm.140 Based on this 
error, the Ninth Circuit states incorrectly: “The FTC identifies no such harm 
to competition.”141  
On the law, the Ninth Circuit rejects the well-established principle that 
harming customers can be a way of harming competition: “[T]he primary 
harms the district court identified here were to the OEMs who agree to pay 
Qualcomm’s royalty rates—that is, Qualcomm’s customers, not its competitors. 
These harms were thus located outside the ‘areas of effective competition’—
the markets for CDMA and premium LTE modem chips.”142 The notion that 
harms to customers in the relevant market are outside the scope of the 
antitrust laws is simply bizarre.  
In any event, as noted above, the District Court also found harm to 
Qualcomm’s rivals in both of the relevant markets it identified. The Ninth 
Circuit further erred by stating that “the district court’s ‘anticompetitive 
surcharge’ theory fails to state a cogent theory of anticompetitive harm.”143 
The Ninth Circuit’s logic at this point assumes that Qualcomm’s royalties 
reflect the value of its SEPs, but that is directly contrary to the District 
Court’s finding that Qualcomm used its monopoly over modem chips to 
obtain a royalty surcharge, above and beyond the royalties Qualcomm could 
obtain based on its SEPs.144 One cannot dismiss findings regarding the effects 
 
137 For a detailed discussion of Qualcomm’s efforts, see FTC v. Qualcomm Inc., 411 F. Supp. 
3d 658, 672-74, 814 (N.D. Cal. 2019). 
138 FTC v. Qualcomm Inc., 969 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2020).  
139  Id. at 996. 
140 The Ninth Circuit also states: “Furthermore, competing chip suppliers are permitted to 
practice Qualcomm’s SEPs freely without paying any royalties at all.” Id. at 997.  The real economic 
question is what fee Qualcomm extracts when an OEM purchases a modem chip from a Qualcomm 
rival, not whether the OEM or the rival pays that fee. This too is a basic principle of taxation covered 
in textbooks. 
141  Id. at 996. 
142  Id. at 999-1000. 
143  Id. at 998. 
144  Id. at 1000 (attempting to distinguish this case from Caldera Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. 
Supp. 2d 1244 (D. Utah 1999), where Microsoft was found to have violated the antitrust laws by 
requiring OEMs to pay a royalty on every machine, whether or not it contained Microsoft’s 
operating system). 
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of a royalty surcharge by assuming away that very surcharge. Hopefully the 
Supreme Court will correct these blatant errors. 
Qualcomm’s use of its separate monopoly power over modem chips to 
evade its FRAND commitment couldn’t be remedied in contract, making 
antitrust enforcement a necessity for reasons beyond simply enforcing the 
FRAND deal.145 In the standard-setting context, if a SEP owner breaches its 
FRAND commitment and is thereby able to charge unreasonably high 
royalties to device manufacturers, those royalties are likely to be passed 
through in large part to final consumers. Antitrust enforcement can protect 
consumers from these overcharges.146 
But to the extent that antitrust can step back in some settings, that is only 
possible because the market participants have recognized and responded 
effectively to the patent holdup problem by requiring reasonable licensing 
terms, and because the courts have enforced that requirement in contract or 
patent law. The second prong of the Antitrust Division’s attack on FRAND 
commitments therefore undermines whatever merit there might be to the first 
prong. While on the one hand Delrahim says that we don’t need antitrust 
because contract and equity will solve the patent holdup problem, on the other 
hand he is advocating policies that make it harder for contract and patent law 
to solve that very problem. Threatening SSOs with liability—maybe even per 
se liability—for trying to stop SEP holdup undermines the very contractual 
solution on which Delrahim purports to rely. So too do Delrahim’s periodic 
claims that holdup is a good thing, or at least something we should accept,147 
 
145 For a discussion of the importance of the FRAND commitment to the FTC’s case against 
Qualcomm, see Erik Hovenkamp & Timothy Simcoe, Tying and Exclusion in FRAND Licensing: 
Evaluating Qualcomm, ANTITRUST SOURCE (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 6-12), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3523797 [https://perma.cc/S2PZ-BETY]. 
146 See Joseph Farrell, John Hayes, Carl Shapiro & Theresa Sullivan, Standard Setting, Patents, 
and Hold-Up, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 603, 608-09 (“[D]ownstream consumers are harmed when 
excessive royalties are passed on to them . . . . This is . . . an antitrust problem.”). Werden and Froeb 
argue that antitrust can do nothing about misrepresentations and failure to abide by FRAND 
commitments because those don’t attack the process of competition itself. Gregory J. Werden & 
Luke M. Froeb, Why Patent Hold-Up Does Not Violate Antitrust Law, 27 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 
2, 21, 26 (2019). But they confuse complaints about holdup in the abstract with challenges to 
misrepresentations and other behavior by a monopolist designed to avoid a commitment to 
permitting competition. See Jorge L. Contreras, Much Ado About Hold-Up, 2019 U. ILL. L. REV. 875, 
875 (2019) (“Patent hold-up is a form of market behavior, not a legal cause of action . . . . To the 
extent that hold-up behavior constitutes an abuse of market power, with resulting harms to 
competition, longstanding doctrines of antitrust and competition law exist to sanction it.”). 
Anticompetitive conduct by companies like Qualcomm designed to avoid or evade a FRAND 
commitment can violate the antitrust laws, just as fraud and other conduct—even conduct not itself 
illegal—can be the anticompetitive conduct necessary for any other sort of monopolization claim. 
See, e.g., Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297 (3d Cir. 2007); FTC v. Qualcomm Inc., 
411 F. Supp. 3d 658 (N.D. Cal. 2019). 
147 Delrahim, “New Madison”, supra note 122, at 8 (“Stating that a patent holder can derive 
higher licensing fees through hold-up simply reflects basic commercial reality.”). 
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his incorrect claim that patent holdout is a bigger problem than patent 
holdup,148 and his advocacy for undoing or avoiding eBay and giving a patent 
owner the right to an automatic injunction.149 Indeed, under Delrahim, the 
Antitrust Division evidently objects even to voluntary commitments by patent 
owners not to seek an injunction as part of the standard-setting process.150 
Ironically, this assault on SSOs and FRAND policies may actually necessitate 
more antitrust intervention in standard-setting. If the DOJ encourages 
companies like Qualcomm to ignore their FRAND commitments, and if the 
DOJ discourages SSOs from trying to solve the SEP holdup problem, or 
impedes their efforts to do so, antitrust may ultimately have to step in to 
protect a functioning market from SEP holdup. 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The theory of holdup is well-supported by a substantial body of empirical 
evidence. For valid conceptual and practical reasons, this empirical literature has 
not involved showing that large-scale actual holdups are common. Rather, the 
evidence generally comes in the form of efforts by private parties to contract 
around holdup. The same types of evidence and the same standards regarding 
empirical work should be applied when testing the theory of patent holdup. 
When such standards are applied, it is clear that the problem of patent 
holdup is substantial. Indeed, patent holdup, and especially SEP holdup, are 
very difficult strains of holdup to manage. Furthermore, the problem of patent 
holdup is quite common, since it arises whenever the efficient development of 
new products and services involves substantial investments that may turn out 
to be specific to another party’s patent portfolio. Not surprisingly, therefore, 
virtually all players in the high-tech industries affected by holdup participate 
in voluntary organizations where they agree to limit everyone’s rights 
(including their own) in an effort to pre-commit to avoid holdup. 
Both the theory and the empirical work relating to patent holdup indicate 
that market participants have strong incentives to devise institutions to limit 
patent holdup. Considerable progress was made between 2006 and 2016 in 
controlling patent holdup in the United States, primarily through the courts, 
but also through competition policy enforcement. Unfortunately, some of 
 
148 See id. at 10 (“[I]mplementer hold-out poses a more serious threat to innovation than 
innovator hold-up.”). 
149 See U.S. Dept. of Just., supra note 120,  at 12-14 (arguing that the injunction rights of patent 
holders should be “[p]rotected, not [p]ersecuted”); cf. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. PATENT & 
TRADEMARK OFFICE & NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., supra note 120, at 5 (“[T]he 
remedies that may apply in a given patent case include injunctive relief . . . .”); Delrahim, supra note 
97, at 6 n.14 (seeming to acknowledge the wisdom of eBay but in the same breath giving the ITC 
free rein to ignore it and impose automatic injunctions). 
150   Letter from Makan Delrahim to Sophia A. Muirhead, supra note 121. 
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that progress is now at risk due to a drastic shift in policy at the Antitrust 
Division of the Department of Justice. That shift is based on faulty 
economics, relies on flawed arguments, and is contrary to both patent law and 
the empirical evidence. 
Rather than go backward, more forward progress is needed to manage and 
control patent holdup in general and SEP holdup in particular. 
• The costs caused by the problem of SEP holdup can be reduced if 
more SSOs follow the lead of the IEEE by clarifying and 
strengthening their patent policies. The SEP policies of many SSOs 
are certainly valuable, but efforts by Qualcomm and others to ignore 
or game their FRAND commitments show the necessity of SSOs 
being more explicit about just what their FRAND commitments 
entail. 
• The costs of SEP holdup can be reduced if the ITC joins the policy 
mainstream by recognizing that exclusion orders based on FRAND-
encumbered SEPs are normally not in the public interest, provided 
the SEP owner has another available legal venue through which it 
can secure reasonable royalties. The White House reined in the ITC 
in 2013 when it sought to grant exclusion orders despite the 
patentee’s commitment to license the patents. The ITC should 
affirmatively apply that policy. 
• Most importantly, the courts should enforce reasonable SSO policies 
that target SEP holdup. Courts have been doing this as a matter of 
contract law, but patent owners seeking to engage in holdup have 
strong incentives to ignore or find ways to undermine, avoid, or 
evade their FRAND obligations. When they do so, antitrust must be 
willing to step in to protect competition and consumers by stopping 
patent holdup. 
